Introduction to Nonviolence

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University of California, Berkeley
Fall 2006
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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PACS 164A Fall 2006

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Chapter II

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Gandhi's spiritual vocabulary: some terms, and Gandhi on yajña, Nagler, M. N.
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Introduction
From Gandhiian Nonviolence: Levels of Satyagraha, Sonnleitner, Michael
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excerpts,
From Mahatma Gandhi: Reflections on his Life & Work, S. Radhakrishnan
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From Nonviolence - the greatest force, M. K. Gandhi
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A short chronology of Gandhi's life,
From The Gandhi Reader, Homer Jack
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Page 3
various excerpts.
From *Satyagraha in South Africa*, Gandhi, M.K., translated Valji Govindji Desai
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Ch. 1, 2, 4.
From *In Gandhiji’s Mirror*, Pyarelal and Sushila Nayar
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*Gandhi: Leader of the Masses*.
From *Indian & Foreign Review* 10/15/96,
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*Nonviolence in the Talmud*, Kimelman, Reuven
From *Roots of Jewish Nonviolence*, ed. Allan Solomonow
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From *City of God: Book 10*, St. Augustine
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*chap 3, Deception*.
From *Jesus & the Disinherited*, Thurman, II
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PACS 164A: INTRODUCTION TO NONVIOLENCE

M. Nagler (Lara Duncan, Eli Sasaran)

PACS 164A is dedicated to the theory and practice of nonviolence, especially principled nonviolence, which Mahatma Gandhi called “the greatest force at the disposal of humankind.” We will in fact be using Gandhi as our primary example, since he was the first, and remains so far the greatest pioneer of this science. The main purpose of the course is to help us understand how nonviolence works, which will enable us to account for its successes and failures - and ultimately understand how to use it in our own lives as well as a tool for social change. The theory will emerge from a fairly close study of the history of nonviolence from earliest times up to the brief career of Martin Luther King, Jr., with particular emphasis on the career of Gandhi first in South Africa (1893-1914) and then in India (1915-1948). Students will become familiar with this history and develop a way to analyze it, so that they leave the course more able to understand (and communicate to others) some of the basic laws of nonviolent dynamics.

Like most PACS courses, 164A is undervalued at 3 units. There is a considerable amount of reading, and keeping up with that reading is important for the kind of lively, informed discussion we typically have in class. There will be a final paper, with an outline or preview to be handed in around the time of the midterm, and there will be a midterm and a final exam. The exams and the final paper are counted about equally for grading purposes - all this will be discussed in due course.

In addition to the books listed below, there is a reader at Copy Central (on Bancroft) and a reserve book list for items which will eventually show up in Moffitt. PACS 164A is listed on Courseweb. NOTE: 164A is prerequisite to 164B, “Nonviolence Today.”

Course Outline

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<td><strong>Section I: Background and general principles.</strong></td>
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<td>1. Aug.29-31</td>
<td>Overview: strategic and principled NV; what to look for</td>
<td>Section La of Reader (Rdr.); Flinders in Gandhi the Man, Nagler Ch. 1-2; Abu-Nimer 5-25 (recom.)</td>
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<td>2. Sept. 5-7</td>
<td>More background: how ‘science’ and ‘history’ weigh in on the possibility of the ‘NV effect’</td>
<td>Rdr. 1.b (Science &amp; History):</td>
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<td>Rdr. 1.c; Bhagavad Gita, Ch. 1-2, 4, 6, 18</td>
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<td>Note: <strong>Continue reading Nagler through Ch. 8 at your own pace . . .</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Section II: The Story Unfolds</strong></td>
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<td>The First Phase: Arrival in South Africa to the birth of Satyagraha (1893-1906); Constructive Program</td>
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<td>Success in South Africa: Return to India and the year of silence.</td>
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<td>Tragedy at Amritsar: rebellion heats up</td>
<td>Rdr. II.b; Gandhi, <em>V&amp;O</em> 29-48 and 154-end; Fischer, 10-26</td>
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<td>8. Oct. 17-19</td>
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<td>9. Oct. 24-26</td>
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<td>10. 10/30-11/2</td>
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<td>Lynd, 1-5, 8, 10, 15a, 16, 25</td>
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<td>12. Nov. 14-16</td>
<td>CRm, II: King’s last years</td>
<td>Frady (recom, and choose your own selections)</td>
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<td><strong>Section IV: The Legacy</strong></td>
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<td>13. Nov. 21-23</td>
<td>Tu: The ‘Wheel of NV’; Gandhian economics</td>
<td>Rdr. IV, Gandhi, <em>CP</em> Ch. 4 &amp; 18</td>
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<td>Th: THANKSGIVING HOLIDAY</td>
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<td>14. Nov. 28-30</td>
<td>Aspects of NV since Gandhi and King (a foretaste of PACS 164B)</td>
<td>To be announced</td>
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<td>15. Dec. 5-7</td>
<td>Grand overview. Th: Term Papers Due</td>
<td>No new reading ☞</td>
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Required texts:

M.K. Gandhi, *Hind Swaraj, or Indian Home Rule*

__________, *Constitutive Programme*

__________, *Vows and Observances*

Eknath Easwaran, *Gandhi the Man*

__________, *Nonviolent Soldier of Islam*

__________, *The Bhagavad Gita*

Louis Fischer, *Gandhi: His Life and Message for the World*

M.N. Nagler *The Search for a Nonviolent Future* *

M.L. King, Jr. *Testament of Hope*

Lynd and Lynd, *Nonviolence in America* **
Recommended texts:
Mohammed Abu-Nimer, *Nonviolence and Peace Building in Islam*

Marshall Frady, *Martin Luther King, Jr.*
Geoffrey Nuttall, *Christian Pacifism in History*

* Other translations are acceptable
**This title will also be used in PACS 164B*
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- Course Syllabus
- Acknowledgments (and page numbers)

## Section I: Background and General Principles

a) A conceptual framework for nonviolence

- Kenneth Boulding: "The Place of Nonviolence in a General Theory of Power"
- M.K. Gandhi: "Four Basic Terms" from *The Harijan*. 1920
- Ralph Summy: "Nonviolence and the Case of the Extremely Ruthless Opponent" from *Legacy and Future of Nonviolence* by True & Adams 1996

- *Key Terms Pamphlet* by the Einstein Institution


  l. b) 'Science' and 'History'

- Wendell Berry: *Life is a Miracle: An Essay Against Modern Superstition*. [excerpt]
- Max Plank & Henry Stapp: "Quotations" from *New Physics*.
- Henry Stapp: *Quantum Physics and Human Values*. 1989
- Nick Herbert: "How to Be In Two Places at the Same Time" from *New Scientist*. August 2, 1986
- Frans de Waal: *Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals*. [excerpt, Ch.1: Darwinian Dilemmas]
- Frans de Waal: *Peacemaking Among Primates*. [excerpt, Ch. 6: Humans] 1989

Philostratus: *The Life of Apollonius of Tyana*. [selection]

Karen Ridd: An incident in El Salvador


I. c) A new/old alternative: basic ideas of the Vedanta

M. N. Nagler: *Gandhi’s Spiritual Vocabulary—Some Terms*


M.K. Gandhi “Five Great Yajnas,” from *Hindu Dharma*.

Section II. The Story Unfolds

a) South Africa


M.K. Gandhi: “Nonviolence the Greatest Force”

Homer Jack: *Short Chronology of Gandhi’s Life*, from *The Gandhi Reader*. 1956


II. b) India


*Unfolding of Satyagraha in India* (1915-1924) from Preface to *Satyagraha in South Africa*.

Bipan Chandra: “Gandhi: Leader of the Masses” from *Indian & Foreign Relations*. October 15, 1996

Section III. The Western Experience of NV

Reuven Kimelman: “Nonviolence in Talmud” from *Roots of Jewish Nonviolence*, ed. by Allan Solomonow

Saint Augustine: *The City of God: Book XIX*. [excerpts]

Howard Thurman: “Deception” from *Jesus and the Disinherited*. 1976

Martin Luther King, Jr.: “Principles of Nonviolence”
Section IV. The Legacy

- Vinoba Bhave: “The Bhodan-Ganga Flows On” from Moved by Love.
- Terry Mollner: “Business, the Relationship Age, and a New Kind of Nation”
- Essays In Gandhian Economics eds. by Romesh Diwan and Mark Lutz
  - Handa Madan: Gandhi and Marx; “An Outline of Two Paradigms” [Ch.13]
  - Romesh Diwan and Sushila Gidwani: “Elements in Gandhian Economics” [Ch.3]
  - J.D. Sethi: “Poverty, Alienation, and the Gandhian Way Out” [Ch.15]
- Michael Toms: “Saving our Cultural Environment” from New Dimensions, November 1998
- Quote from Marija Gimbutas from M. Nagler, America without Violence.
Section I: Background and General Principles
   a) A conceptual framework for nonviolence
4
THE ROOT CAUSE OF WAR

The root cause of war is threefold: possession, power, and justice.

But seeing that possession is a "right" over things, and power is a "right" over men, and that the reasoning animal's whole activity expresses itself in juridical terms, the cause's name can be shortened to justice.

The root cause of war and of all wars on both sides: the spirit of justice. "We have the right! We are right! We have been wronged!" There, rightly or wrongly, lies the cause of war.

Justice, or rather the impurity of man's justice; justice combined with covetousness and pride, which are the essence of sin.

The rights claimed being neither of the order of nature nor of the order of the absolute, but fictive and conventional, contestable and contested, the sacred pronouncements can always be jiggled with, and this is where the devil enters the game.

Which explains why war is always just, doubly just—just on both sides. And the more just it is, the more atrocities it justifies.

The task of nonviolence is to free man from the chains of legitimate violence and its infernal logic.

5
SEVEN OBVIOUS TRUTHS THAT NOBODY WANTS TO SEE,
or
AXIOMS OF NONVIOLENCE

"Peace" is a strong word. It has the same root as "pact" and presupposes agreement confirmed by sworn faith and the law. It has the same root as "pay" (pax means "to appease") and so implies measured compensation. It is an act, an act that costs an effort. It belongs to the same family as "compact" and implies solidity and coherence.

This simple consideration of the meaning of words reveals the oneness of peace with justice which is stability, balance, and law.

Everyone knows that injustice makes peace impossible, for injustice is a state of violence and disorder which cannot and must not be maintained. It asserts itself through violence, holds sway through violence, and leads to the violence of revolt, which shows that if justice is the reason for peace, it is at the same time the cause of revolution and war, acts that always draw their justification from the defense or conquest of rights and the abolition of injustice.
And this is the crux of the matter: the connection of justice with strife, a truth signified by the sword Justice carries in her right hand. This is no figure of speech. At the heart of all conflict there is the cry, "I am absolutely right! And the brute there, that fiend, will not listen to reason, so that I have not only the right, but the duty to force him, or do away with him."

And there we have the sinews of war and of every quarrel. The causes of war are sometimes attributed to hatred, contempt, pride, envy, covetousness, and other wicked feelings (and sometimes it is true, and sometimes not true at all).

Or they are attributed to our duty to maintain established order, cost what it may. Or to the right and duty to reverse that order at all costs for the sake of the oppressed and exploited and to ensure that the world of tomorrow will be more just.

By which it can be seen that in all human conflict, whether personal or collective, the chain of violence is reinforced by the chain of good reasons, on both sides. It must therefore be admitted that justice is not only the pretext or excuse of violence, but its very cause. Moreover, whereas one or other of these causes may be absent, justice is always present as a cause and is sometimes the sole cause.

But we started off from justice the foundation of peace, and here we come to justice the cause of all conflict. Are there two justices then?

Yes, the true and the false.

The true, which is one as truth is one. True justice is at one with truth. It is above everything, in everything, inscribed in the order of things, exists by itself and is God.

False justice is double and contradictory and, like mental aberration, engenders illusion and idols. But men cling to these phantoms more tenaciously than to reality, and so are tormented and torn asunder and hurled against each other in the perpetual war named history.

Let no one say of justice what is commonly said of truth:

Seven Obvious Truths That Nobody Wants to See

that it is inaccessible. Say rather that it is inevitable, obvious as light to the eye, and all error claims its support.

How does true justice lapse into false?

By means of these three arguments:

1. That we have the right to render evil for evil and so call the evil rendered good and just.

2. That the end justifies the means and good ends justify bad means.

3. That reason, agreement, and consent do not suffice to maintain justice and that it is just to have recourse to fear, compulsion, and force, not only in exceptional cases, but by means of permanent institutions.

These three arguments are tenets of faith for the common man, for the good as for the wicked. They are never called into doubt, never discussed, and on them people base their civil law and rules of behavior.

It has seldom been noticed that they are self-contradictory and can only lead to endless conflict.

Therefore justice and truth require us to disentangle ourselves from these arguments and their consequences. We must free ourselves from them under penalty of death. For the fact is that if today we cannot find other means of solving human conflict, we are all condemned to die.

The good news that must be announced in our time is that these means have been found. They are the arms of justice, or active revolutionary nonviolence.

The nonviolent can be distinguished by their refusal of the three arguments everyone repeats in order to justify violence. Nonviolence says:

1. No, evil is not corrected or arrested by an equal evil, but doubled, and to have recourse to it is to become a link in the chain of evil.
2. No, the end does not justify the means. Evil means spoil the best causes. If the end is just, the means must be so too.

3. No, fear, compulsion, and force can never establish justice, any more than they can teach us truth. They can only twist conscience. Now, the righting of conscience is what is called justice.

The nonviolent directly adhere to and act from the justice that is one, universal, and as simple as two and two make four. Hunger and thirst for justice are what make them act. They are servants of justice and do not make justice their servant so as to justify acts dictated by the motives mentioned earlier or reactions dictated by the adversary's attitude.

That is why Gandhi names direct nonviolent action "Satya-graha," that is to say, an act of fidelity to truth. The victory the nonviolent seek is to convince the enemy and bring about a change of heart, to convert him by fighting him and, in the end, to make a friend of him.

Is the thing possible? How can it be done? Who has ever done it? In what circumstances, and with what results? I shall not answer here. Whole books have been written on the subject.

The first thing is to learn and understand what it is; the second, to try it out for oneself. But it cannot be learned like arithmetic or grammar. Learning and understanding nonviolence are done from within. So the first step is self-recollection, reflection on the principles, and conversion, that is to say, turning back against the common current.

For if the purpose of your action is to make the adversary change his mind without forcing him to, how can you do so unless you yourself are converted? If the purpose is to wrest the enemy from his hatred and his evil by touching his conscience, how can you do so if you have not freed yourself from hatred, evil, and lack of conscience? You want to bring peace into the world, which is very generous of you; peace to the utmost ends of the earth, for you are great-hearted, but do you know how to bring peace into your own house? Is there peace in your heart? Can one give what one does not possess?

As for justice, can you establish it between yourself and others, even those who are strangers and hostile to you, if you cannot succeed with your nearest and dearest? And what is more, if you cannot establish it between you and yourself?

But do not jump to the discouraging conclusion that in order to enter nonviolent combat one must be a saint or a wise man, or perfect. This form of combat is for one and all, and we can enter it as we are, with our indignities (and even all the better as we are fully conscious of them). But we should know that in principle, if not in fact, we must prepare ourselves as for all struggle. Here, however, preparation must be inward.

On the other hand, the struggle itself and the tribulations it involves are exercises that will help our transformation, and self-mastery is a pledge of victory over evil.

Peace and justice are a harmonious adjustment which does not come about by itself but is the fruit of effort and work upon oneself, before and during confrontation. That is why Vinoba says, "The training ground for nonviolence is man's heart."

But drill is not enough, nor courage, nor reason. There must also be music and a sense of harmony.

Let us proceed to the other tenets of everyman's faith:

4. All violence, including murder, becomes lawful in the case of self-defense. Another argument that no one calls in doubt.

Do you? Yes. Because self-defense is legitimate, a right and a duty, but murder, which is offense, not defense, is not.

Therefore one should not speak of legitimate defense, but of justified offense, which is self-contradictory.

I have no more right to take someone's life in order to defend mine than I have to take his wife in order to ensure my own happiness.
Let it rather be called "natural" or "animal" defense. It is of capital importance not to drag the law into this matter.

For if we consider legitimate the exceptional case where one can see no other means of stopping aggression than killing, we shall build up on it a whole system of legislation and institutions whose sole office will be to prepare and perpetuate murder.

And that is what we have done. The army, the police, and criminal law are that and nothing else.

Defense will no longer be natural and for that reason excusable; it will be premeditated and systematic crime, and there will no longer be any moral restraint or limit to killing and cruelty.

5. Murder is not only permissible, but a duty when common welfare requires it. Now the "common welfare" in question is not the welfare of all. It is the welfare of a limited group, even if it includes millions of people (the number involved makes no difference). Common welfare cannot be achieved at anyone's expense. Common welfare is justice and charity toward every human being.

6. Technology, economy, and politics are morally neutral. They obey their own natural laws. Here is how men build the gigantic machinery in which they are caught and crushed.

That efficiency is good and always necessary for doing something goes without saying, but it is senseless to attribute value to it in itself. If efficiency lies in doing evil, then the better it is, the worse it is.

7. Justice is established order. This seventh argument, unlike those that have gone before, is not accepted by everyone. There is no regime which does not have its rebels. But the conviction of the greater number is such that the ordinary citizen is ready to kill and die through obedience to law and power.

Now the law fixes morals. Morals are the effect of a certain balance of force between tribes and classes, hard-won facts which make possible civil life and work in common.

By the standards of absolute justice, the law always has lamentable shortcomings, in addition to which holders of power commit errors and abuses, all of which is covered over by habit and ignorance. But should the balance of power shift, consciences awake, and there ensues revolt which results in the creation of other states of injustice.

There must therefore always be a law to correct the law, and the law is constantly having to be amended and adjusted, as in liberal regimes.

But liberal regimes are unstable and continually shaken by rivalry, so that governments have more to do to stay in power than to govern. Nevertheless, they still have enough strength to abuse their power, and the people enough passion and blindness to abuse their right of opposition. The liberal regime is no doubt more humane than others, but criticism by the opposition is less pure because it requires less courage. Legal and illicit means exist of denouncing injustice in the press and raising questions in parliament, but the rich, the powerful, and the intriguers remain masters of the game.

That is why one must have no fear of resorting to direct nonviolent action and, if necessary, of breaking the law openly, seeking legal punishment and undertaking facts and other sacrifices, so that the justice which is above all law may dawn in men's consciences.

This does not mean that direct nonviolent action is impossible in nonliberal regimes. To be sure, it is more difficult, and victory less certain.

But whoever does not attempt it at a relatively easy stage deserves to fall into bondage and undergo dictatorship.

Murderous rebellion, disorder, and cowardly acquiescence alike foster tyrannical regimes.
it does have some elements of threat and economic power in it. I might add a fourth category, organization power. This is the power of coordinated action rather than dispersed action. This may be quite informal, as to some extent it was even under Gandhi or Martin Luther King, but there are very important elements of more formal organization there too. The military has very strong organization power in terms of permanent peace-time armies, military drills, training, and so on, which contributes to its survival. Even though the actual power of threat is rather weak, yet the sacrifice involved in military action does tend to legitimize it in the minds of the people who support it. The legitimacy of the military is enhanced with soldiers dying for their country much more so than it is by soldiers killing for it. Non-violence tends to be less effective if it lacks organizational power. The success of Gandhi and Martin Luther King had a lot to do with the fact that they created an organizational power of non-violence. Non-violent organizations, however, tend to be temporary and local, inspired by the needs of the moment, and do not have the organizational power of the military, though there are some indications—peace brigades, conflict-management training, and so on—that this may be beginning. As this develops, we may see the end of military power both offensive and defensive as losing all legitimacy... (Here ends the typed manuscript. What follows is in Professor Boulding's own hand-writing.)

... as nonviolent defense against military invasion by a foreign power becomes well organized, and as civilian non-violent defense against their 'own' military are better recognized. The recognition that the world military system is a single system, in which the component national forces derive their legitimacy (and therefore budgets) from rival national & military forces, is an important step towards achieving a collapse of the legitimacy of military organizations. The recognition that a system depends for its survival on it being accepted by those affected as 'legitimate' is very important. I have argued that the dynamics of legitimacy governs the whole social process is still to be discovered by most social scientists, though the dynamics... (Here ends Kenneth Boulding's hand-written manuscript.)

ENDNOTE

I now proceed to summarize the explanations I gave of the various terms. It is beyond my capacity to give accurate and terse definitions.

**Satyagraha.** Then, is literally holding on to Truth and it means, therefore, Truth-force. Truth is soul or spirit. It is, therefore, known as soul-force. It excludes the use of violence because man is not capable of knowing the absolute truth and, therefore, not competent to punish. The word was coined in South Africa to distinguish the non-violent resistance of the Indians of South Africa from the contemporary ‘passive resistance’ of the suffragettes and others. It is not conceived as a weapon of the weak.

**Passive resistance** is used in the orthodox English sense and covers the suffragette movement as well as the resistance of the nonconformists. Passive resistance has been conceived and is regarded as a weapon of the weak. Whilst it avoids violence, being not open to the weak, it does not exclude its use if, in the opinion of a passive resister, the occasion demands it. However, it has always been distinguished from armed resistance and its application was at one time confined to Christian martyrs.

**Civil disobedience** is civil breach of immoral statutory enactments. The expression was, so far as I am aware, coined by Thoreau to signify his own resistance to the laws of a slave state. He has left a masterly treatise on the duty of civil disobedience. But Thoreau was not perhaps an out-and-out champion of non-violence. Probably, also, Thoreau limited his breach of statutory laws to the revenue laws, i.e., payment of taxes, whereas the term “civil disobedience” as practised in 1919 covered a breach of any statutory and immoral law. It signified the resister’s outlawry in a civil, i.e., non-violent manner. He invoked the sanctions of the law and cheerfully suffered imprisonment. It is a branch of satyagraha.

**Non-co-operation** predominantly implies withdrawing of co-operation from the state that in the non-co-operator’s view has become corrupt and excludes civil disobedience of the fierce type described above. By its very nature, non-co-operation is even open to children of understanding and can be safely practised by the masses. Civil disobedience presupposes the habit of willing obedience to laws without fear of their sanctions. It can therefore be practised only as a last resort and by a select few in the first instance at any rate. Non-co-operation, too, like civil disobedience is a branch of satyagraha which includes all non-violent resistance for the vindication of Truth.

M.K. Gandhi
OKAY, SO YOUR FIRST WISH WAS FOR AN AVOCADO SANDWICH. IT'S LIKE YOU'RE NOT EVEN TRYING, KID. NOW, FOR YOUR SECOND WISH, I WANT YOU TO THINK BIG. MONEY, POWER, FAME... WHATEVER!

AN END TO VIOLENCE IN THE WORLD!

AN AVOCADO SANDWICH AND AN END TO VIOLENCE IN THE WORLD. NICE COMBINATION, KID. LOOK—WHY DON'T I MAKE THE WISHES AND YOU BE THE FROG!
Nonviolence and the Case of the Extremely Ruthless Opponent

Ralph Sumley

One of the most common criticisms of nonviolent action—from academics, politicians, and general public alike—is its ineffectiveness against an extremely ruthless opponent. As long as an opponent is willing and able to resort to acts of severe repression, a nonviolent response is considered not only instrumentally inappropriate, but possibly also the cause of inciting the degenerate and sadistic amongst the enemy’s forces to even baser forms of brutality.

Leaving aside the observation that similar reservations can be expressed about the appropriateness of a violent response in such circumstances, I shall attempt, in this paper, to examine critically—in terms of both a theory of power and the empirical evidence—the orthodox view concerning the limitations of nonviolence. Are the critics, it will be asked, posing the right question in assessing whether or not nonviolence “works.” If not, in place of the ruthless factor, is there any question or series of questions highlighting other factors that might prove cogently sound in predicting the success or failure of a nonviolent strategy?

Since we live in a society steeped in utilitarianism, for the purposes of this paper, “success” will be measured at the instrumental level. This is the level at which the challenge is raised. Is the nonviolent method, in the face of extreme ruthlessness, an effective means of achieving a designated, tangible goal? What are the chances of a cost/benefit calculation working out favourably for the nonviolent proponent? Other interpretations of success are not germane to this inquiry. For instance, whether nonviolence offers intrinsic value to its practitioners, opens up avenues of expressiveness, or cultivates a range of personal skills, or has long-term value benefits for society in which “right” means become “right” ends in the making, these sorts of criteria of “success” fall outside the bounds of the present exercise. Nevertheless, the exclusion of such criteria as a frame of reference does not imply that they lack significance beyond the narrow definition adopted by most of the critics of nonviolence.

A second proviso also narrows the inquiry. It will be assumed—accepting the common assumption of the detractors of nonviolence—that the choice lies between violence and nonviolence. Yet in the range of real world conflicts this is clearly not so. A violent response may be manifestly imprudent and thus it may be ruled out by even the most ardent of militarists, or the cause of resistance may be better served by doing nothing or pursuing “conventional” means rather than by acting nonviolently. This paper, therefore, examines the orthodox argument from the standpoint of one of its own highly arguable pre-analytical assumptions.

Thirdly, a distinction is made throughout between the spheres of “nonviolent politics” and “conventional politics.” Apart from the latent violence structured into the state and many other institutions and norms, most political activity is nonviolent in a generic sense that it does not directly involve killing, harming, or physically coercing fellow human beings. Conventional politics is usually nonviolent in this limited sense. However, it lacks one or more of a number of other characteristics that distinguish it from nonviolent politics. In the case of the latter, the action is always, by definition, physically nonviolent, and most of its votaries are conscious of—and seek to avoid—structural and psychological violence. A nonviolent action is also readily identifiable by the fact that it lies outside society’s regularised patterns of political behaviour. It tends to be considered novel or unusual and as a weapon of the powerless. It sometimes is illegal. It always carries with it an element of risk (however small) for its practitioners, because it is seen by the authorities and their supporters as not only “different” but also as a potential challenge to the established way of conducting politics and hence to the security of their position. Paradoxically, nonviolence is often exercised as an alternative to violence in situations where the standard response might widely be expected to be the use or threat of physical force. Irrespective,
however, of whether opponents might prefer and even acknowledge nonviolence as reasonable or legitimate under certain circumstances, they still are apt to respond with violent measures of their own. On the other hand, were the action to have been conducted in the conventional sphere of politics, a violent response on the opponents' part, would constitute a rejection of their own system. To avoid this obvious contradiction, any violent response, if entertained at all, would most likely be confined to illegal and covert channels.

A fourth point also needs to be clarified at the outset. The analysis centres on the efficacy of nonviolence qua strategy. There can be no disputing the fact that in an immediate tactical situation, where an attacker is bent on violence and strikes swiftly, as in an assassination attempt or surprise armed assault, a positive nonviolent response is usually not a viable option for the targeted victim. When such a situation arises or has been allowed to develop, then the practical option of survival for those under fire becomes the classic “fight or flight.” However, what is being questioned in this article is the generalised belief that at the strategic level, a nonviolent campaign against a “no holds barred” opponent is destined to meet the same fate.

A final point concerns the use of the concept of “ruthless opponent.” In this paper, the concept covers a wide sweep: from a regime that might sporadically apply extreme brutality, or target only a small number of dissidents, to one where there is a total clampdown on any internal opposition and borders are closed to the penetration of foreign media. The latter, or a “totalitarian” regime, would generally be considered the “worst-case scenario.”

THE ORTHODOX CASE

The subject of nonviolent politics is not extensively examined in the mainstream literature of political science, nor is it given considerable thought by most politicians and defence analysts. If it is raised at all, it tends to be misrepresented (e.g., equated with passive resistance, pacifism, direct action, or civil disobedience), or else perfunctorily and derivative dismissed as naïve and unrealistic. Its major weakness is seen to be linked to the nature of the opponent’s response. As long as the opponent lacks the will or capacity to inflict severe reprisals or abides by a moral or political code of self-restraint, nonviolent political action has a chance of being successful. But without those pre-conditions it will be crushed by the effective application of superior firepower, the ultima ratio of conflict resolution.

This position was reflected in the reasoning of former Australian Defence Minister and political-scientific scholar, Kim Beazley, when he explained the Australian government’s reluctance to embark on an investigation into the feasibility of civilian-based defence. He observed that “nonviolence proved effective for Gandhi in India’s struggle for independence, because the British were relatively benign.” It is argued that against a power prepared to exercise its repressive force to the fullest, a nonviolent strategy is defeatist. At best it is limited to a declaration of popular sentiment that keeps alive the prospects of unified opposition by orthodox strong arm methods at a later date.

French sociologist Raymond Aron expressed similar reservations when responding to George Kennan’s favourable reference to the potential of nonviolence in the latter’s 1956 Reith Lectures. As summarised by Aron, Kennan’s “theory” could be reduced to the following proposition: “It is enough that a population, even without arms, be resolved to make a conqueror’s life impossible, for the latter to discover, little by little, the vanity of conquest.” To Aron, such an assertion was seriously flawed, “in so far as it claims to be realistic” (italics in original). He insisted it was open to decisive objections, because it envisages certain facts and overlooks others. First of all, it assumes that the day of massacres or exterminations is definitively over, that a people which lays down its arms will be neither deported nor reduced to slavery nor simply exterminated. Unfortunately, there is no reason for subscribing to this act of faith.

He then went on citing a number of historical tragedies that befell peoples who failed to offer armed resistance, as, for example, the Jews under Hitler and the Incas and Aztecs at the hands of the Spanish invaders.

The Aron argument, despite its appeal to realism, suffers from at least three major flaws. Not only has he engaged in the logical fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter hoc argument, since the mere
sequence of the events does not establish any causal relationship between failure to resist violently and massacres that followed, but, more importantly, in all the cases he has cited, no concerted nonviolent campaigns, either spontaneous or planned, were conducted. Even if nonviolent campaigns had occurred, the ensuing calamities might have resulted from deficiencies in the way the campaigns were staged, and have had nothing to do with the intrinsic nature of nonviolence. Therefore, how can it be said that nonviolent policies is the cause of the disasters? Part of Aron's problem stems from his unstated assumption about the theory of power about which I would say something more later. Another problem can be traced to his misunderstanding of nonviolence which he equates with passive resistance. In making the same point as Beasley about British restraint in India (a claim of arguable historical accuracy\textsuperscript{13} as well as dubious political science), he states that "the effectiveness of passive resistance, as practised by the Indians under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi, is subordinate to the respect, on the part of armed men, for certain rules (my emphasis)."\textsuperscript{14}

George Orwell, who considered Gandhi a "dangerous fool" in calling for nonviolent resistance to the tyrants of Europe, put his case as follows:

"It is difficult to see how Gandhi's method could be applied in a country where opponents of the regime disappear in the middle of the night and are never heard of again. Without a free press and the right of assembly, it is impossible not merely to appeal to outside opinion, but to bring a mass movement into being, or even to make your intentions known to your adversary."

Thus, nonviolent resistance is considered "impossible" against the extremely ruthless dictator who presides over a totalitarian system. It cannot effect the downfall of such a regime. Indeed, political scientist Michael Walzer takes the argument one step further. He observes: "Nonviolence, under extreme conditions, collapses into violence directed at oneself rather than at one's murderers."

Walzer seems more sensitively attuned to the complex dynamics of nonviolent strategy than the other critics—having taken the trouble to familiarise himself with some of the literature.
Nonviolence and the Extremely Ruthless Opponent

Nonviolence, in other words, is reduced to a futile but heroic gesture against any opponent who wields power with consummate ruthlessness. The exception to this monolithic exercise of violence occurs when the opponent or his auxiliaries are restrained by a code of conduct similar to that of the nonviolent resisters. However, asserts Walzer:

When one cannot count on the moral code, nonviolence is either a disguised form of surrender or a minimalist way of upholding communal values after a military defeat. Though civilian resistance evokes no moral recognition among the invading soldiers, it can still be important for its practitioners. It expresses the communal will to survive and though the expression is brief, as in Czechoslovakia in 1968, it is likely to be long remembered. The heroism of civilians is even more heartening than that of soldiers. On the other hand, one should not expect much more from civilians confronted with a terrorist or potentially terrorist army than brief or sporadic resistance.17

Walzer's position is summarised in the statement "nonviolent defence depends upon noncombatant immunity."20 Such "immunity," he insists, is apt to be lacking in the case of a foreign occupation where the social distance and cultural differences between protagonists are often great or other concerns (like the invader's own perceived security or welfare) take precedence. The same general rule—I am sure Walzer would argue—also applies to the effectiveness of nonviolence in domestic conflicts. Subjects without "immunity" will find collective nonviolent action an inappropriate form of resistance.

While the advantages of directly enjoying "immunity" from an opponent are indisputable, the efficacy of nonviolence, in my view, involves a political process that can extend beyond this single dimension, even in a totalitarian state. One can find the key ingredients to "success" by turning first to the theory of power behind the dynamics of nonviolence and bearing in mind the notion of strategic choice expressed in the following three quotes:

The outcome of nonviolent struggles can only be examined in the light of the entire sequence of choices made by both protagonists and the effects that these choices have on their total relative power as the conflict unfolds.21

In a totalitarian state, Walzer asserts, the nonviolent leadership can be singled out for arrest, torture, and execution, and disappear without trace. A climate of fear pervades the populace. He opines: "It is virtually certain that the men and women of the occupied country—those who have been marked out for survival, at any rate, and perhaps even those who have been marked out for death—will yield to their new masters and obey their decrees." According to Walzer's assessment: "The country will grow silent. Resistance will be a matter of individual heroism or of the heroism of small groups, but not of collective struggle."16

![Figure B](image)

+ Independent 0 Dependent +

Ruled

1

2

Ruler.
You can erect a throne using bayonets but you cannot sit on bayonets for long. The days of the conspirators are numbered. I ask you not to carry out their decisions. Strategy is to build something.

**THEORY OF POWER**

The nonviolent theorist begins with the proposition that government power is dependent and therefore potentially very fragile. No ruler, from the most despotic to the most democratic, can rule without the consent or compliance of a sizeable fraction of the populace. The dependency relationship can also extend to well-positioned minority groups. For example, if any group of key advisors, administrators, policemen, military personnel, and workers in vital areas such as energy supply, transportation, and communication refuse (or threaten not) to formulate policy and carry out their duties—and competent replacements cannot be found to fill the vacancies—the ruler's power is drastically undermined. Moreover, a minority of outcast group that has no direct dependency relationship can still control the power wielded over it by mobilizing the support of third and fourth parties that do have the capacity to exercise direct leverage over the ruler.

Notwithstanding the very real problems presented by extreme ruthlessness, it is still necessary to focus on the fundamental leverage of dependency that the ruler exerts over the ruler. Their obedience or compliance is required. Gene Sharp, the doyen of nonviolent scholars, makes this his central thesis. And there are many political theorists on whom he can draw for support, ranging from Machiavelli to Comte to Weber to Macleod.

As he conceives of power, it is something given to the powerholder and what can be given can also be withheld. There is a choice available.

When people refuse their cooperation, withhold their help, and persist in their disobedience and defiance, they are denying their opponent the basic human assistance and cooperation which any government or hierarchical system requires. If they do this in sufficient numbers for long enough, that government or hierarchical system will no longer have power. This is the basic political assumption of nonviolent action (my emphasis).

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Sharp's view of power stresses the fact that it is fragile, nebulous, fluctuating, and easily destroyed. He calls his view "pluralist," because the loci of power are widely diffused. Power is not a monolith, flowing downward and held in the hands of one central authority, not even in a totalitarian society (which he is theoretically a misnomer). Although the initiative in the power relationship of ruler/rule rests with the latter, who can withhold consent, the ruler can, nonetheless, mobilize certain sources of power in order to obtain that consent. These sources Sharp identifies as "authority" (people's acceptance of the ruler's right to command and be obeyed without imposition of sanctions), "human resources" (number of people prepared to assist ruler), "skills and knowledge" (capacities of these functionaries), "material resources" (ruler's degree of control over natural and financial resources and the means of communication and transportation), "intangible factors" (psychological, cultural, and ideological factors predisposing people to obey), and "sanctions" (use of "stick" against recalcitrants).

However, against these sources a campaign can be mounted by the ruler. The power sources can be undermined as long as people appreciate the ephemeral nature of the sources and the reasons why the ruler has been obeyed in the past. Sharp notes that people's political obedience has various, multiple, and interrelated explanations. He cites seven major ones: (i) habit; (ii) "fear of sanctions"; (iii) "moral obligation" arising from considerations of the common good of society, attributing superhuman qualities to the ruler's recognition of the ruler's legitimacy, and conforming to commands as accepted norms; (iv) "self-interest" in supporting ruler; (v) "psychological identification with the ruler," (vi) "zones of indifference" about some laws and policies; and (vii) "absence of self-confidence" among subjects. Once people have become aware that sources of a ruler's power are not a fixed quantum, intrinsic to his being, but are dependent on people's obedience and assistance, they can set about designing strategies and tactics that strike at the ruler's points of greatest vulnerability. " Grave social, economic, and political problems that involve at some point a serious maldistribution of power" can be righted through the mobilization of "popular empowerment" based initially on actions of non-cooperation and defiance. For the oppressed of the world, Sharp's focus on the privileged powerholders' dependency offers
the hope of radical social change through "weapons of nonviolence." He has catalogued in great descriptive detail almost two hundred methods of nonviolence that are at the disposal of the people in overcoming a ruler's domination and since the publication of his classic work, he tells me that he has discovered—or been informed about—approximately another two hundred methods. In other words, due to the dependency of the ruler's position, it is not necessary to overpower him (and it usually is a "him") with superior blocks of power but to actively deny him, through the four hundred or so methods that he cannot rule without, viz., popular support.

This dichotomous theory of power appeals in its simplicity. It also means that people have a choice. Voluntarism and bipolarity, however, minimise the complexities of social reality. Sharp does not sufficiently consider that structures such as capitalism, patriarchy, state, bureaucracy, and technology (which also embody social relations) can impose barriers between the ruler-subject dichotomy, making it difficult for people to escape their regular patterns of behaviour. Brian Martin sees these structures as not only possible complicating the starkness of the Sharpian dualism but actually replacing it. In his words, many structures reflect "social interactions, so regular and entrenched that they take on a dynamic of their own." When examining power in structural terms, nearly everyone is both superordinate and subordinate in different ways. Thus various systems of power must be taken into account when mobilising any nonviolent action. An example given by Martin is the relationship of oppressed workers with the ruler. While in principle labour can be mobilised to walk off the job, in practice it is not quite that simple.

The workers are likely to be divided along lines of status, skill, wages, gender and ethnicity; the mass media may provide little support or active disinformation; certain workers may have been tied to the regime by dispensation of special favours, being involved in corruption, or compromised by participation in repression of minorities; education in nationalism may make it easy for the ruler to raise the spectre of foreign enemies, external agitators and hurting the national interest.

Gaining unity and sustaining commitment is affected by a full range of interlocking structures. Also, to understand the dynamics operating in a society, a theory of power needs to incorporate the cultural dimension. Traditions of independence and opposition to authority, values regarding violence and attitudes to learning, beliefs about "chosenness" and approaches to conflict management, and above all, the paradigm by which people process knowledge and experience, all significantly interpose themselves between the protagonists, so that at a particular moment in history, people may not be able to choose freely for nonviolent resistance. The problem is not the brutality of the opponent but the psyche within the resistor. For example, an argument can readily be mounted to demonstrate that the Palestinians would have had greater chance of success in securing an independent homeland if they had resorted to nonviolence. Yet much more is involved in convincing them to adopt such a strategy than a simple reduction to the thinking of Western instrumentalism. It is interesting to note that the mainly nonviolent action of the intifada sprang up spontaneously out of a visceral desperation at the grassroots and not as part of a planned strategy emanating from PLO leadership.

While not invalidating a social analysis that looks at structural and cultural factors, Sharp's neo-liberal picture of the ruler-subject dichotomy would be strengthened, in my opinion, if it were to feature in its theory a clear recognition of the numerous systems of power that intercede and pose problems for the Sharpian ideal functioning of nonviolence. How and whether these problems can be overcome needs to be addressed, in some form or other, whenever a nonviolent strategy is formulated. Nevertheless, the basic theory of the ruler's ultimate dependence on a significant section of the ruled is irrefutable and provides an important insight for nonviolent strategists. Their task is to bring the conflict to the point where that dependency relationship comes to the fore. Dependence should be seen as representing the centre of gravity in effecting successful nonviolent action.

Although mobilising resistance around the intrinsic relationship of dependence faces special problems in the totalitarian system, the task is far from impossible. In the first place, totalitarian control is an ideal that can never be achieved one hundred percent in practice. There will always be leaks in the monolith, even against a Stalin or a Hitler. The problem is to overcome the paralysis of fear, to use it creatively, to realise that "moments of profound doubt can give birth to new certainties." With
relationship. It is necessary, though not sufficient, part of a successful calculus. There are many examples of brutal tyrants and totalitarian systems capitalizing to improvised nonviolent action and in every case a dependency relationship either existed between the protagonists or was established indirectly through third parties. There are two kinds of dependency relationships:

(a) direct dependency; and
(b) indirect dependency.

Direct Dependency

A notable example of the first category of a direct relationship is the nonviolent campaign against the Shah of Iran during the upheaval of 1978-79. Basically, the revolution (or overthrow) was conducted nonviolently as a relatively minor insurrectional act of violence contributed to the downfall of a highly totalitarian regime. Despite possessing enormous military capability—the Iranian government being backed by one of the best equipped armies in the world and allied to the world’s most lethal military machine—the Shah and his immediate successor Bakhtiar were unable to govern a country where the overwhelming majority of people refused to accept their authority. No degree of brutality, assassination and torture carried out by the Savak, or secret police, could blunt the people’s revolutionary fervour. To paraphrase an apocryphal metaphor of Gandhi’s: It was as if the Shah and his underlings were continually striking their swords upon a body of water. Their arms became exhausted and their strength was rendered powerless.

The Ayatollah virtually used the same metaphor. The only difference is that he substituted the word “blood” for “water.” “Blood,” he proclaimed, “will achieve victory against the sword.” At the height of the uprising he implored: “People of Iran, sacrifice your blood to protect Islam and overthrow the tyrant and his parasites.” To shoot down people who were shouting “Praise be to Allah,” gave to the victims an eternal salvation while bringing down on the Shah and his subordinates the damnation of an entire nation. The turning point of the revolution is said to have occurred on 8 September 1978 when a large crowd, led by teenagers and veiled women, was raked by automatic gunfire, leaving between two and three thousand dead in Tehran’s Jami’ Square. From that moment on, Iranians across the political spectrum, including members of the armed forces, were dedicated to the Shah’s demise. Cries of “Death to the Shah” became common.

The Ayatollah scarcely followed the Gandhian tradition. But he utilized effectively one of the same political strategies—that of “moral jiu-jitsu.” This term was first used by Richard Gregg to describe the process whereby nonviolent activists disarm an extremely ruthless opponent with his own weapons system. He is thrown off balance. The exposure of his violence against nonviolent protesters casts him in an extremely bad light. He may lead to shifts in opinion, and then may reshape power relationship favorable to the nonviolent group. As Sharp explains:

Cruelties and brutalities committed against the clearly nonviolent are likely to disgust many people and to fill some with outrage.

Even milder violent repression appears less justified against nonviolent people than when employed against violent resisters... Thus, wider public opinion may turn against the opponent, members of his own group may dissent, and more or less passive members of the general grievance group may shift to firm opposition.

Sharp calls this process “political jiu-jitsu,” because he is interested in changing power relations. He believes that its effects—as noted above—may be registered on functionaries of the ruler, on third parties outside the immediate conflict, and on the aggrieved group itself. It can both widen the number and deepen the resolve of the resisters. A case in point, cited by Sharp, occurred in Czechoslovakia during the uprisings of 1969.

On November 17, 1969, Czech riot police brutally suppressed nonviolent demonstrators demanding free elections and democracy in the streets of Prague. These beatings galvanized political opposition to the hard-line Communist regime. Czechs and Slovaks erected shrines at the main sites of the beatings, raising those injured to the stature of heroes. Hundreds of thousands took to the streets daily following the police actions. As one student put it, the beatings were “the spark that started the whole movement.” Within four weeks the Communist hard-liners were forced to resign, and the Communist Party had to relinquish its majority of Cabinet positions.

There were many other incidents of violence against nonviolent dissidents rebounding to the advantage of the nonviolent
forces during the events of Eastern Europe in 1989. The key component was that people began to lose their fear and thus were able to build a movement to the point that the leverage of dependency could be exercised to telling effect. Despite beatings, imprisonments, torture, and executions, people refused to submit. When this sort of defiance is waged on an extensive scale, no system, brutal or benign, can long survive. Violent sanctions, by themselves, will not induce obedience; they must incite fear. "Importantly," notes Sharp, "when fear of punishment does not control the subjects' minds, repression is unlikely to succeed. As in wars, the prospects of physical injury and death do not cause soldiers at the front to face or to surrender." Similarly, if nonviolent proponents "believe in their cause sufficiently, they are likely to continue the struggle regardless of the danger to them individually." 1

The nonviolent resistance movement against President Pinochet in Chile began to make headway as soon as the individual resisters came to terms with personal fear. "This was our first, but most important step," observed a Chilean woman whose son was amongst the desaparecidos. This did not mean that the resisters exposed themselves to unnecessary dangers. They proceeded carefully in small groups that operated underground. In the open, they often resorted to symbolic protests such as the "cold-shoulder" treatment, and social ostracism. In responding to decrees and orders they engaged misunderstanding; in the workplace they made use of "quiet mistakes" in the obstructionist manner of the Good Soldier Scherck. 2

Latin Americans have a long history of nonviolent action—or brazos caídos (literally, fallen arms)—against ruthless dictators. Much of it has been successful, in the sense that the dictator was deposed. According to Patricia Parkman, "the existence of such a tradition…has been visible throughout the region (in Brazil and Haiti, as well as in the Spanish-speaking republics) at least since the early years of this century." 3 Between 1931 and 1961, sixteen Latin American presidents left office in the wake of civic strikes. 4 With the exception of two of these men, their record of human rights abuses was legendary. Another four civic strikes during this same thirty-year period were unsuccessful. The Latinas themselves refer to all such insurrections as the huelga general or general strike, a term borrowed from the labour movement. However, researcher

Parkman believes that this term "obscures the distinctive cross-class character of the civic strike," which she defines as "the collective suspension of normal activities by people of diverse social groups united by a common political objectives." 5

One of the most notable of these "total" civic strikes was mobilized against strongman Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez of El Salvador in 1944. He had been in absolute control of the country since 1932, initially consolidating his power with a massacre estimated to number between eight and thirty thousand in a country that, at the time, had a population of about one million. The successful peaceful uprising twelve years later was preceded by a botched armed uprising. Indeed, the ruthlessness of the way he dealt with the hapless insurgents is what provoked a broad cross-section of the population to engage itself in a series of "national shutdowns." The success of their action then inspired attempts to unseat the governments of the other three Central American dictatorships, also by nonviolent means. However, only one of these proved successful—the one against Jorge Ubico of Guatemala. One of the more ironic historical footnotes to Martinez's downfall is that a national day is now celebrated in El Salvador to commemorate the heroic patriots who fell in the armed insurrection, while the success of the nonviolent civic strike is left to the reflections of a handful of scholars.

The ultimate test for the efficacy of nonviolence is usually posed in the form of the question: "Yes, but what about Hitler or Stalin?" Although nonviolence was not tried on a large scale against either of these tyrants, there are cases where it was improvised and it met with successful results. Some of the most dramatic episodes occurred in Norway against the Nazi puppet Vidkun Quisling. After the German invasion in April 1940, an underground resistance sprang up. Some violence was displayed but the major response was nonviolent. Indeed, entire campaigns were conducted nonviolently—exploiting the government's direct dependence on the cooperation of the citizenry. Far from the "individual heroism" to which Walzer restricts nonviolent action, large segments of the society challenged nonviolently the radical restructuring policies which the Nazis sought to impose through their agent, Quisling. Sporting associations, the clergy, the justice system, railway workers, and teachers refused to cooperate and obey the directives handed down by the conqueror. 6 The teachers
are a prime example. When Quisling ordered the teachers to introduce a curriculum promoting the idea of the fascist "corporate state," some 8,000 to 10,000 out of a total of 12,000 immediately sent in letters of resignation. Their defiance led to the arrest of hundreds and their internment in a concentration camp under conditions of torture and starvation. Yet very few yielded. At home, parents protested the government's action and those "teachers not arrested refused to be intimidated," so that "eight months later the teachers were released."53

In due course, Hitler intervened and ordered that the experiment of the "New Order" be abandoned.54

Resistance against the Nazis was also waged with a modicum of success in Denmark and Holland. As in Norway, violence characterised some, but by no means all, of the actions. In the first three years of Denmark's occupation, the resistance was almost purely nonviolent. The Nazis were severely harassed and their objectives remained unfulfilled by a combination of strikes, demonstrations, boycotts, delaying tactics, and symbolic actions. Illegal underground newspapers were printed, and evacuation routes were organised that enabled approximately seven thousand Danish Jews to flee to neutral Sweden. "All [these actions] contributed to the effective resistance in Denmark against the German occupation."55

The Nazis' inability to deal effectively with nonviolent resistance in Denmark, Norway, and Holland—and to a lesser extent in France and Belgium—was a major finding of British military historian, B.H. Liddell-Hart who interrogated German generals after the war. In his words:

They [the Nazis] were experts in violence, and had been trained to deal with opponents who used that method. But other forms of resistance baffled them—and all the more in proportion as the methods were subtle and concealed. It was a relief to them when resistance became violent and when nonviolent forms were mixed with guerrilla action, thus making it easier to combine drastic repressive action against both at the same time.64

A partial explanation of the success of nonviolent resistance against the Germans in the northern European countries can be attributed to the fact that the Nazis regarded the inhabitants as fellow Aryans. An image of the "self in the other" restrained their behaviour. A sense of co-humancy established a bond of moral dependency, so that they were not free to deal with these people as they were with Jews, Slavs, and Gypsies. A dependency of interest also existed as they needed their support in order to effectively prosecute the war, maintain standards at home, and realise wider objectives like the One Thousand Years Reich. Yet there is evidence that the Nazis were even thwarted in their genocide of the "subhumans" (untermenschen) in some areas of their conquest, because they were dependent on the support of the very population they planned to exterminate. Despite moving into Eastern Europe to gain Lebensraum for the German Volk, they soon discovered that they required the cooperation of their intended victims. A leading German military administrator in Byelorussia is reported to have admitted in 1942 that "German forces could not exercise effective control without enlisting the population."69 The same author cited a statement issued by German military commanders in the Soviet Union in December 1942, declaring the serious nature of the situation in that area which makes the cooperation of the population necessary. Russia can be beaten only by Russians.66 Another German commander, General Harteneck, wrote in May 1943: "We can master the wide Russian expanse which we have conquered only with the Russian and Ukrainians who live in it, never against their will."69

Hard-line Soviet communism, too, faced nonviolence resistance on a number of occasions. The 1968 nonviolent response of the Czechoslovaksians to the Warsaw Pact invasion of their country is well-documented. For eight months, the occupying forces were unable to gain control. The death-knell of communism finally sounded throughout eastern Europe in the last quarter of 1989 when, with few exceptions, it was the method of nonviolent popular action that toppled government after government. Nonviolence was put to another severe test, this time within the Soviet Union itself, when the Russian people successfully thwarted the attempted coup of August 1991. Whilst asserting the multiplicity and complexity of the causes behind these successes, Adam Roberts contends:

The whole chain of events in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union could be seen as a triumph of civil resistance [a movement that is
nonviolent and whose goals are widely shared by the community, validating the proposition that all government, even totalitarian governments, are based on the consent and cooperation of the ruled: take that away, and the regime must collapse (my explanation in brackets).

A less famous case of nonviolence, at the height of Soviet power, occurred in remote Siberia. In 1953, a strike of 250,000 inmates at the Vorkuta labour camp was instigated, mainly by the state’s political prisoners. Although some of the strike leaders disappeared and others were shot, the prisoners continued their strike against their poor conditions for over three months. In the end, food and fuel shortages forced them to capitulate, but when they went back to work they were granted some of their demands.

Indirect Dependency

The gains achieved from the Vorkuta strike came about to some extent because the prisoners were able to win the sympathy of their Russian guards, who slipped in supplies and spread leaflets between the camps. When the Russian soldiers were replaced by non-Russian-speaking Asians from far eastern republics, the strike eventually collapsed. Thus a third party played an important role in sustaining the strike and therefore in heightening the tension between protagonists.

There are other occasions where a third party or series of other parties go beyond this role of merely assisting in the mobilisation of the nonviolent action and actually form the dependency linkage with the opponent. If an aggrieved party has no, or a weak, dependency relationship, a third party on whom the opponent is dependent may act as surrogate. The strategy of nonviolent protesters, who cannot directly utilise a dependency relationship with their opponent, is clear: appeal to or coerce a third party that has both linkage to you and to the opponent. Gallung calls this mechanism of operation, “the great chain of nonviolence.” He stresses the “self-other gradient,” which, if it is too steep, forces the oppressed to look for “third-party intervention (or better, intercession) from somebody closer to the oppressor.” Yet the problem need not be a lack of dependency caused by social distance or dehumanization but rather the lack of dependent interests. A ruler can be just as ruthless in dealing with a group of subjects he does not need anything from as he can be with subjects he considers to be subhuman. In most cases the brutality reflects both a lack of strong material need and an image of subhumanity.

Such a case is exemplified in the brutal response of the US administration and its satraps to the Vietnamese people. The communists and the people they led had no relationship of any kind with their US opponent. What they were able to do was link up with American “doves,” including combat soldiers and draft resisters, thereby vicariously exerting pressure on the American “hawks” and forcing their withdrawal. Whether the nonviolent intervention was induced out of compassion for the two million Vietnamese killed is problematic. But whatever the motivation, the end result was effected by the converging of a number of third-party dependency factors. The American leadership was dependent on the voters at home; it depended on a drug-free army on the battlefront; it depended on a middle-class young generation integrated into its value system; it depended on the survival capacity to control and direct the many upheavals threatening the social order at that time. Thus the course of the war, despite its extremely cruel nature, was drastically affected, indeed concluded, by the nonviolence of an intervening third party.

The same “great chain of nonviolence” operated in the case of the US civil rights movement. The Southern blacks had only a minimal dependency relationship with the Southern white power structure and absolutely none with the “red neck” constituency. Interceding on their behalf were the liberal white community of the North and the Northern blacks who were in a position to exercise leverage on the national leadership. In turn, the national leadership, through civil rights legislation and the enforcement of Supreme Court decisions, was able to bring pressure to bear on a reluctant South. This process began with the nonviolent actions of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference under Martin Luther King and those of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and the northern-based Congress on Racial Equality—the latter group having a long history of commitment to nonviolent struggle. These groups through the process of moral jiu-jitsu were able to bring to the surface the injustice and violence of Southern racism which horrified many Northerners to the extent that they insisted that American liberal values be applied universally throughout the
land. The murders and beatings administered by Southerners to “uppity” nonviolent blacks rebounded against the brutal bigotis because a communication network existed to trigger a third party into action.

Even against one of the most inhumane acts of this century—the Holocaust—there are examples of nonviolence proving successful through the intervention of third parties. Indeed, one can argue that it was not the ruthlessness of the Nazis that led to the Holocaust but the ubiquity of the Jew's marginalisation. Where the Jews were not marginalised by the rest of the society, as in Denmark and Bulgaria, they survived the “Final Solution.” One can even point to isolated acts of nonviolence within Germany “working” against the Nazi policy of genocide. A famous case occurred in Berlin on 27 February 1943 when the Nazis rounded up Jews married to non-Jews, as well as their children, and processed them for shipment to Auschwitz. The German spouses responded immediately, demonstrating outside the Gestapo headquarters in Rosenstrasse, shouting for the return of their husbands despite the threat of being machine-gunned. The amazing thing is that the protest succeeded, inasmuch as thousands were released. A tragic sequel to the event is that some of the husbands, who did not then go into hiding, were later rounded up one by one and shipped off for extermination. This time the Gestapo realised how to prevent any collectively organised protest. Only the husbands that went underground survived.

The dynamics behind the positive response of the Gestapo to the women's collective protest is instructive. As long as the dependency relationship activated by the third party takes precedence over the lack of concern for, or interest in, the oppressed people, the nonviolence of the interceding group will “work.” The extreme ruthlessness of the ruler towards the intended victims is overridden. Explains Galtung:

In other words, over a small gap in social distance, with less dehumanization, nonviolence worked— even a simple, primitive type of nonviolence measured by Gandhian standards. The “Aryan” wives bridged the gap, being the Self in the Other to the Nazis and the Other in the Self to their husbands. Without that bridge it would not have worked.

The Gestapo was presented with a moral dilemma by the German spouses. Here were females of “good” German stock protecting their homes. The women were displaying the nobility of womanhood and the courage associated with the true “Aryan spirit.” Also, the wives enlisted, through their demonstration, the sympathy of other Germans. On the other hand, when the husbands could be picked off separately and the Nazi leadership could avoid facing the contradiction in their ideology and the outrage of other Germans, no amount of individual nonviolent protest could save the doomed husbands.

Many other cases can be cited to show that nonviolence has “worked” in the past, either directly or indirectly, through the rallying of third-party support.

**CONCLUSION**

*On the basis of both the theory of power and the history of nonviolent actions, nonviolence does work against extremely ruthless opponents. As Kenneth Boulding was fond of saying, “what exists is possible.” The key question to ask in determining the efficacy of nonviolence is not how ruthless is the opponent (although this is an important consideration in designing a nonviolent strategy and selecting the appropriate techniques), but rather, does a dependency relationship exist, either on the basis of interest or morality, between the protagonists directly or through “the great chain of nonviolence” that can be utilised to the advantage of the ruler? The existence or establishment of a dependency relationship does not ensure success, but it is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition. The only exception would be the opponent's collapse due to his own complete shortcomings or the independent actions of other parties. But to effect changes with input from the nonviolent actor, a dependency must be evoked somewhere along the line.*

Some of the other strategic principles that nonviolent proponents should consider and act upon, to enhance the prospects of success, include:

(i) development of a strong organisational network that is decentralised but bound together by a communication system allowing for constant consultation and the fostering of integrated action.
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(ii) challenging the societal myth(s) that lie behind a problem;
(iii) building of solidarity and morale;
(iv) training of nonviolent activists;
(v) planning of strategy and tactics:
   (a) choosing wisely between dispersion and concentration
   (b) choosing the right mechanism of change
   (c) selection of key targets to focus on
   (d) maintenance of initiative
   (e) flexibility
   (f) looking for legitimacy;
(vi) consistency (no waxing and waning) and persistence (over time);
(vii) selection of a compelling issue;
(viii) obtaining clarity and unity over objectives amongst nonviolent actors;
(ix) exhausting of conventional alternatives before engaging in nonviolent action (as long as such methods are clearly not futile and only serving to prolong oppression); and
(x) taking steps to secure the outcome:
   (a) negotiating effectively
   (b) seeking to replace necessary functions that the defeated adversary performed
   (c) preventing third parties from replacing the defeated adversary and undermining recently achieved gains
   (d) preparing to re-initiate struggle if the opponent reneges on negotiated settlement.

If the nonviolent strategist wisely integrates the above ten supportive principles (which are by no means exhaustive) with the necessary condition of dependency, then the chances for success improve tremendously. However, as with violent politics, there can be no guarantees of success. All one can say with certainty about nonviolent politics is that it will not succeed without the ruler's dependency.

Aristotle recognised this insight when he pointed out that a tyrant "wants his subjects to have no mutual confidence, no power, little spirit." Reverse the situation—that is, make them dependent on him in a dominating relationship—and he can rule indefinitely.

In practice, however, subjects do display from time to time qualities of what we now call "empowerment"—leading Aristotle to observe: "Still, oligarchy and tyranny are shorter-lived than any other constitution." If hegemonic control, in Weberian terms, is suffused throughout the society's values, structures, and practices, a new Weltanschauung may need to be forged in order to cast off the dependency. It is far easier to mobilise resistance against the exercise of overt violent power where the issues of dominance and dependency are visible and unequivocal for all to behold. Thus in situations where nonviolent proponents seek very radical structural changes, it can even be asserted that nonviolence is apt "to work" better if the opponent is extremely brutal.

Hitler may not have read Aristotle or Weber. But he was aware of the vulnerability of dictators when the populace was of an independent mind. He and his generals recognised where the power of nonviolence was rooted. In a conversation in May 1943 with Alfred Rosenburg, reported by the latter, the Fuehrer observed:

"Ruling people in the conquered regions is, I might say, of course a psychological problem. One cannot rule by force alone. True, force is decisive, but it is equally important to have that psychological something which the animal trainer needs to be the master of his beast. They must be convinced that we are the victors."

That any government is founded ultimately on consent—and not on brutal force—was unequivocally acknowledged by Hitler. "For, in the long run," he wrote, "government systems are not held together by the pressure of force, but rather by the belief in the quality and the truthfulness with which they represent and promote the interests of the people."

If Hitler admitted that nonviolent defiance could threaten a government and suggested that it could work under conditions of severe repression, a prima facie case exists for extensively investigating its dynamics. It certainly behoves students of political science to understand far more clearly both the limits of nonviolent sanctions and their potential. Adam Reich, commenting on the aftermath of the collapse of communism, wrote:

What can be asserted is that nonviolent methods have a greater importance than has been allowed for in many philosophies, whether of Left or of Right."
Notes and References

1. In calculating a wide range of "arguments" and "actions" in support of "social defense," Brian Martin also notes that the question of "strategic repression...is one of the most challenging...and also one of the most common" questions to be raised. See his "Social Defence: Arguments and Actions," in Richard and James Lebak (eds.), Nonviolent Struggle and Social Defense (London: War Resisters' International, 1994), p. 99.


5. Christopher Kruegler and Patricia Parkman essentially make the same point about not confusing tactics with strategy. "On a radical level," they declare, "superior armed force can control many if not all situations. Any act of resistance that is limited in time and place can be negated by sufficiently ruthless opponents. On the theoretical and political levels, however, the probable effects of violence become less easy to calculate." See his "Identifying Alternatives to Political Violence: An Educational Imperative." Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 55, No. 1, February 1985, p. 119.


8. Only a few politicians, as far as one can gather from their statements and writings, appear to understand the nonviolent theory and dynamics behind the success of the new social movements, and only a few European governments have incorporated a civilian-based defence component into their defence policy or even bothered to investigate its feasibility.


10. Kim has also shown an interest in nonviolent defence on other occasions. In particular, see his review of Gene Sharp's book Making Unstoppable: The Potential of Civilian-Based Defence and Defense in New York Review of Books, 23 February 1980, pp. 3-4. This review was subsequently included as a foreword to a later edition of the book.


12. Ibid., p. 631.


17. Ibid., p. 331-32.

18. Ibid., p. 333.

19. Ibid., pp. 332-33.

20. Ibid., p. 334.


24. Niccolo Machiavelli says: "The Prince who has the public as his whole for his enemy can never make himself secure and the greater his cruelty, the weaker does his regime become. In such a case, the best remedy he
can adapt it to make the populace his friend. See "The Discourses on the First Ten Books of History," The Discourses of Niccolo Macchiavelli (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1958, Vol. 1, p. 294). August Comte says: "Thus authority is derived from concurrence, and not concurrence from authority.... So that great power can arise otherwise than from the strictly prevalent disposition of the society in which it exists." The Political Philosophy of August Comte (trans. H.L. Martinson, George Bell & Son, London, 1896, Vol. II, pp. 222-23). Max Weber says: "If the state is to exist, the dominated must obey the authority claimed by the powers that be ("Politics as a Vocation," in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (trans., ed. I.H. Gerth and C.Wright Mills, Galaxy Book, N.Y., 1958, p. 29). Robert M. Maccoby says: "Social power is in the last resort this, not inherent in the groups or individuals who direct, control, or coerce other groups or individuals. The power a man has is the power he disposes of, and it is not intrinsically his own. He cannot command unless another obeys. He cannot control unless the social organization invests him with the apparatus of control" (The Web of Government, Macmillan, New York, 1947, pp. 107-108).


26. Ibid., p. 75.

27. Ibid., pp. 19-24.


31. Ibid., p. 216.


34. Ibid., pp. 51 and 53.

35. Ibid., p. 53.

36. Ibid., p. 47.

37. Ibid., p. 54.

38. Ibid., p. 57 and 58.


40. Quoted by Mohammed Helal (former Cairo editor and consul of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat), "Iran: A Nation Ready to Die," The Courier Mail, 26 December 1979.


47. See the novel of Jaroslav Hasek, The Good Soldier Schweik and His Fortunes in the World War, trans. Cecil Parrott, Penguin, Hammondsworth, 1974. This is a reprint of the posthumously published work which Hasek had not completed at the time of his death in 1923.


49. Patricia Parker, Insurrectionary Civil Strife in Latin America 1931-1961 (Cambridge, Mass.: The Albert Einstein Institution, 1980), Monograph No. 1. This paper was first presented at the 1989 AGM of the American Political Science Association. The eleven Latin American presidents overthrown by nonviolent resistance were: Carlos Romulo del Campo (Chile 1924); Gerardo Machado (Cuba 1933); Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez (El Salvador 1944); Jorge Ubico (Guatemala 1944); Eli Lecost (Haiti 1950); Arnault Arian (Panama 1951); Paul Magloire (Haiti 1956); Jose Nemo (Peru 1952); (Haiti 1957); Frank Sylvia (Haiti 1957); Gustavo Rojas Pinilla (Colombia 1957); and Joaquin Belgraves (Dominican Republic 1961).

50. Ibid., p. 1.


54. Lanza del Vasto, Warriors of Peace: Writings on the Techniques of Nonviolence, p. 211.

tance Movements’?”).


58. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 497.


Key Terms

Bloodless coup: A successful coup d'état in which there is no killing. Not to be confused with nonviolent struggle, although such a coup sometimes follows nonviolent protest and resistance against the government.

Boycott: Social, economic, or political noncooperation.

Civic strike: A collective suspension of normal activities — economic, social, and political — by an entire society to achieve a common political objective.

Civil disobedience: Deliberate, open, and peaceful violation of particular laws, decrees, regulations, military or police orders, or other governmental directives. The command may be disobeyed because it is seen as itself illegitimate or immoral, or because it is a symbol of other policies which are opposed. Civil disobedience may be practiced by individuals, groups, or masses of people.

Civilian-based defense: A national defense policy to deter and defeat aggression, both internal (i.e., coups d'état) and external (i.e., invasions) by preparing the population and institutions for massive nonviolent resistance and defiance. The broad strategy is to deny the occupiers' objectives, block establishment of their government, and subvert their troops. This policy, alone or in combination with military means, has received governmental or military attention in several European countries.

Civilian insurrection: A nonviolent uprising against a dictatorship, or other unpopular regime, usually involving widespread repudiation of the regime as illegitimate, mass strikes, massive demonstrations, an economic shutdown, and widespread political noncooperation. Political noncooperation may include action by government employees and mutiny by police and troops. In the final stages, a parallel government often emerges.

If successful, a civilian insurrection may disintegrate the established regime in days or weeks, as opposed to a long-term struggle of many months or years. Civilian insurrections often end with the departure of the deposed rulers from the country.

The ousters of Ferdinand Marcos in 1986 and the Shah of Iran in 1979 are examples. Also called “nonviolent revolution.”

Economic boycott: The withdrawal or withholding of economic cooperation in the form of buying, selling, or handling of goods or services, often accompanied by efforts to induce others to do likewise. It may be practiced on local, regional, national, or international levels.

Economic noncooperation: The use of economic boycotts or strikes, or both, against an opponent.

Economic sanctions: Usually, the imposition of international economic boycotts and embargoes. The term can also be used in domestic conflicts to refer to labor strikes and economic boycotts, shutdowns, and intervention.

Economic shutdown: A suspension of the economic activities of a city, area, or country on a sufficient scale to produce economic paralysis. It combines a general strike by workers with a closing of businesses by their owners and managers.

Embargo: An economic boycott initiated and enforced by a government.

Fast: Deliberate abstention from certain or all food. When applied in a social or political conflict, it may be combined with a moral appeal seeking to change attitudes. It may also be intended simply to force the opponent to grant certain objectives, in which case it is called hunger strike.

Force: Either: (1) An application of power (including threatened or imposed sanctions, which may be violent or nonviolent). As, “the force generated by the civil disobedience movement.” Or: (2) The body or group applying force as defined in (1), usually used in the plural. As, “the forces at the government’s disposal.”

General strike: A work stoppage by a majority of workers in the more important industries of an area or country, intended to produce an economic standstill to achieve political or economic objectives. Certain vital services, as health, food, and water, may be exempted. Such strikes may be symbolic, lasting only an hour, to communicate an opinion, or may be intended to produce economic paralysis in order to force concessions from the opponent.

Hunger strike: See “fast.”

Mutiny: Refusal by police or troops to obey orders. It can in extreme cases entail individual or group desertion. It is a method of nonviolent action unless the mutineers resort to violence.

Noncooperation: Acts that deliberately restrict, withhold, or discontinue social, economic, or political cooperation with an
institution, policy, or government. A general class of methods of nonviolent action.

Nonviolence: Either, (1) The behavior of people who in a conflict refrain from violent acts. Or, (2) Any of several belief systems that reject violence on principle, not just as impractical.

Otherwise, the term is best not used, since it often contributes to ambiguity and confusion. To describe specific actions or movements, the recommended terms are: "nonviolent action," "nonviolent resistance," or "nonviolent struggle."

Nonviolent action: A technique of action in conflicts in which participants conduct the struggle by doing — or refusing to do — certain acts without using physical violence. It is an alternative to both passive submission and violence. The technique includes many specific methods, which are grouped into three main classes: nonviolent protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and nonviolent intervention.

The technique's variables include the motives for using it, the objectives, the intended way success is to be accomplished (mechanism), and the relation between nonviolent action and other forms of action.

Nonviolent discipline: Orderly adherence to the planned strategy and tactics of an action and to nonviolent behavior even in face of repression. This is a major factor contributing to the success of a nonviolent struggle movement.

Nonviolent resistance: Nonviolent struggle, conducted largely by noncooperation, in reaction to a disapproved act, policy, or government. The broader terms "nonviolent action" and "nonviolent struggle" are therefore preferred to refer to the overall nonviolent technique of action and to action in which the nonviolent group also takes the initiative or intervenes, as in a sit-in.

Nonviolent sanctions: The methods of the technique of nonviolent action. The term is used especially when one wishes to make clear that these methods are not merely expressive behavior but are ways to wield power, exercise influence, inflict punishment, and impose costs.

Nonviolent struggle: A synonym for "nonviolent action." This term may be used also to indicate that the nonviolent action in a conflict is particularly purposeful or aggressive. "Nonviolent struggle" is especially useful to describe nonviolent action against determined and resourceful opponents who use repressive measures and countermeasures.

Pacifism: Several types of belief systems of principled rejection of violence. Pacifism is distinct from the technique of nonviolent action, which is usually applied as a practical way to act by people who are not pacifists. Pacifist belief systems, at a minimum, reject participation in all international or civil wars, or violent revolutions. Pacifists may support nonviolent struggle, or they may oppose it on ethical grounds as too conflictual.

The term "pacifism" or "pacifist" should therefore not be used in relation to nonviolent struggles unless there is clear evidence that pacifists are playing significant roles in the conflict.

Passive resistance: A nineteenth century term once used to describe nonviolent struggle. The term is now in disfavor and rejected because "passive" is plainly inaccurate to describe recent cases of nonviolent noncooperation and defiance.

People power: The power capacity of a mobilized population and its institutions using nonviolent forms of struggle. The term was especially used during the 1986 Philippine nonviolent insurrection.

Political boycott: See "political noncooperation."

Political noncooperation: The withholding of usual obedience to, or participation in, the political system. The aim may be to correct a specific grievance or to disintegrate a government. Political noncooperation can take a great variety of forms, including withholding of allegiance, civil disobedience of "illegitimate" laws, and governmental refusal of diplomatic recognition. A synonym for "political boycott." See also "noncooperation."

Sanctions: Punishments or reprisals, violent or nonviolent, for either failure to act in the expected or desired manner or for acting in an unexpected or prohibited manner. Nonviolent sanctions are less likely than violent ones to be simple reprisals and more likely to be intended to achieve a given objective. See also "nonviolent sanctions."

Satyagraha: M.K. Gandhi's version of nonviolent action, and also his fuller belief system enjoining nonviolent personal behavior and social responsibility. Pronounced sai-ya-gra-ha.

Strike: A group's deliberate restriction or suspension of work, usually temporary, to put pressure on employers or sometimes the government. Strikes take many forms and range widely in extent and duration. See also "economic noncooperation."
Transarmament: The process of incrementally building up a nation’s civilian-based defense capacity and gradually phasing out its military defense capacity. “Transarmament” is contrasted to “disarmament” which involves a simple reduction or abandonment of military capacity without providing a substitute means for national defense.

See also “civilian-based defense.”

Violence: The infliction on people of physical injury or death, or the threat to do so. All behavior cannot be neatly classified as either “violence” or “nonviolence,” and several categories fall between these two extremes, including “destruction of property.”

In reporting a demonstration or resistance movement which is primarily or exclusively nonviolent, care is required to distinguish it, for example, from the acts of violence by small numbers of persons (who may be undisciplined or deliberately disruptive for political reasons or as agents provocateurs). Similarly, a demonstration should not be described as “violent” when it is violently attacked by police or troops but nevertheless maintains its nonviolent discipline.

For Further Information

Journalists’ inquiries about the history, nature, and dynamics of nonviolent struggle may be addressed to:

The Albert Einstein Institution
1430 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
(617) 876-0311

The Albert Einstein Institution is a nonprofit organization which supports work on the strategic uses of nonviolent sanctions in relation to problems of political violence. Independent and nonsectarian, it does not endorse political candidates and is not an advocate of any political organization.
Obstacle: overpowering influence of sense-impressions from which desires (instincts) and egoisms arise. They hide the essential unity of one's self with the Universal Self, and attempts at self-realization are frustrated.

Therefore:
To try to realize the Self involves trying to shed the egoistic component of the person

- to try to act with detachment
- to try to act selflessly
- to act 'without regard to the fruits of one’s action'

On the other hand:
The Self as 'witness' in my person is the Self as 'witness' in other persons. This is 'seen' to the extent that the Self (i.e., its operation) is discriminated from the empirical self. The Self is seen as the essence of all persons and self-realization, in so far as it involves the essence of the Self, involves self-realization of all.

Therefore:
A set-back in self-realization or in the (material or spiritual) conditions of self-realization is a general set-back for humanity. A gain is a general gain.

Hurt oneself is hurting others, hurting others is hurting oneself.

It remains to characterize selfless action: Selfless action, if consistent is being face to face with God, is actualizing the full essential identity with the Self, and in finding or embodying Truth. There is no transcedent God, Self, or Truth; they are immanent in the action.

Further:
Selfless action is action intended to increase the general self-realization without special regard for any definite self, but starting with those who are worst off - the starving, exploited, subjected, oppressed.

D. Non-violence
1. Himsa and ahimsa. Broad and narrow concepts

The Sanskrit word 'ahimsa' as applied in Indian philosophy has many meanings related in different ways to absence of violence, of suppression, exploitation, malevolence.

Occurrences of 'ahimsa' in the Bhagavadgita point to rather narrow concepts, because the term is used for one single characteristic among a series of others. Compare, for instance, the enumeration of good qualities in discourse 13, verse 7, quoted on page 38 above. In this list 'ahimsa' occurs as one single good quality. It is not inappropriately rendered by 'non-harming', 'non-injuring', 'non-harming', 'non-violence', but requires a more specific meaning in relation to the other qualities. If a wide concept were intended, some of these others would only be parts or aspects of 'ahimsa' and it would be unnecessary or misleading to mention them on a par with it. Gandhi's terminology is such that some of the other qualities listed would make up part of the connotation (intention) of 'ahimsa', while most of the others would be covered in its extension.

The general tendency in Gandhi's writings is towards equating 'ahimsa' with all good qualities put together and 'himsa' with all bad ones.

For example, because stealing is bad and non-stealing good, stealing tends to be taken to exemplify 'himsa' and non-stealing (as a principle) 'ahimsa'. (Cf. p. 46 below) Several meanings may occur in the same paragraph: 'It is not enough that there is no violence. A violent speech is often as injurious as a violent deed.'

In the first sentence a narrow, physical concept is intended, a concept narrower than 'injurious'. These are instances of injurious acts which are not violent. But the adjective 'violent' in 'violent speech' has a different meaning. A violent speech is not taken to be a species of violence.

A taste of philosophy: 'ahimsa' is Sanskrit for absence of 'himsa'. The latter correctly written: 'himsa', or 'hina', meaning harming, hurting, injuring, from the root 'hins', harm, hurt, injure, stay. The word 'hins' may in turn have been a form of the verbal root 'hin', which has a large number of meanings: strike, smile, stay, kill, destroy, dispel (darkness), etc. These meanings seem on the whole to be more predominantly physical than those of 'himsa'.

Gandhi, in his application of the term, makes use of several of the meanings of 'ahimsa', and he adds at least two: (1) 'ahimsa' as a designation of his ethics of group struggle - in this sense the term is a proper name for a doctrine, or a closely related set of prescriptions and descriptions; further, (2) as a designation of actions or practice in accordance with 'ahimsa' in the first sense.

Let us see what he himself says about the term:

Ahimsa means avoiding injury to anything on earth in thought, word, or deed.

Adopting a wide interpretation of 'injury', the quotation exemplifies a very wide concept of 'himsa': not avoiding injury to at least one thing
on earth, in thought, word, or deed. ‘Things’ would include all living beings, and perhaps also a selection of non-living things. Destruction as part of sabotage is sometimes referred to as himsa even if the things destroyed are not the property of anyone. To keep things we do not need, but which others might need is ‘injurious’, that is, reducing certain chances that others may have for self-realization.

Non-stealing does not mean merely not to steal. To keep or take what one does not need is also stealing. And, of course, stealing is fraught with violence.55

Under mental forms of injury, the wide interpretations include hurting people’s feelings, hurting their dignity, and hurting relations between others or between others and oneself. The feelings and relations referred to must be positively valued. It would not be himsa if person A hurts the feelings of hatred harboured by person B or his own feelings of hatred towards B. Thus, the wide conception of himsa presupposes an ethics. Consequently an adequate account of the notion of himsa implies an account of the ethics in which himsa is just one of the many notions. As is usually the case in philosophical inquiry, we are led from consideration of a part to that of a total view.

As an example of a broad use of himsa violence, the following is well known:

I cultivate the courage to die without killing, but for the man who does not have this courage I wish him to cultivate the art of killing and being killed, rather than flee shamefully from danger.

For he who runs away is guilty of mental violence: he flees because he has not the courage to be killed in life.46

What the coward violates may be said to be a relation to himself, that of striving for self-realization. A more specific interpretation of the violence of the coward may be given, but our point here is mainly to establish that, used in wide senses, the assertion ‘This is himsa’ does not say much more than ‘This is ethically bad’.

The concept of ahimsa made by negating the wide concept of himsa is correspondingly narrow. This has the important consequence that much is required of a struggle in order to be in accordance with ahimsa. The wider the concept of himsa the narrower, of course, will be the corresponding concept of ahimsa. Considering the need for degrees of ahimsa, the narrow concept might be expressed by the term ‘perfect ahimsa’. Such a grading is applied rather often by Gandhi. Taking ‘violence’ and ‘non-violence’ as conventional renderings of himsa and

ahimsa, corresponding relations will hold between the English words. In order to avoid misunderstanding, one might decide to use the terms ‘nonviolence’ and ‘nonviolent’ without a hyphen, to express high degrees of ahimsa — degrees required according to the doctrine of ahimsa.

It has a positive quality which is not well expressed merely by the negation non-violence. But the lack of a hyphen would often not be noticed and we shall continue to use the negation to express an affirmative idea.

It is sometimes useful to point out an ideal limit, however great or small the chances of reaching it. Gandhi may be said to refer to a ‘zero degree’ of himsa, and a ‘maximum degree’ of ahimsa. But he has made it amply clear that nobody on this planet can help transgressing a norm expressible by ‘avoid doing injury to anything in thought, word, or deed’. The extension of the narrow concept as applied to persons is therefore strictly speaking zero — like the concept of an ideal gas or of ‘the economic man’. As Gandhi points out:

Ahimsa means not to hurt any living creature by thought, word, or deed, even for the supposed benefit of that creature. To observe this principle fully is impossible for men, who kill a number of living beings large and small as they breathe or blink or till the land.57

It is not difficult to find instances in which Gandhi explicitly repudiates what he here says about himsa in relation to benefit. The following is a defence of rathnasam:

Non-violence sometimes calls upon to put an end to the life of a living being. For instance, a calf in the Ashram dairy was lame and had developed terrible sores; it could not eat and breathed with difficulty. After three days’ argument with myself and my coworkers I had poison injected into its body and thus put an end to its life. That action was non-violent, because it was wholly unselfish inasmuch as the sole purpose was to achieve the calf’s relief from pain. It was a surgical operation, and I should do exactly the same thing with my child, if he were in the same predicament.58

A lot of terrorism has perhaps been done ‘wholly unselfishly’, for instance that perpetrated by religious movements. Mostly, Gandhi would not accept the postulate of unselfishness as sufficient for the qualification of non-violence. But Gandhi also subscribes to a graduated norm of minimising himsa: to avoid as much as possible, and as often as possible, the injury of beings. Mostly, or perhaps always, he has living beings in mind, but recent development of the movement against in-
jury to nature may well find it adequate to subsume its basic norms
under the above very general principle of *ahimsa*, either read as an
imperative or as a valuation: it is of negative value to injure anything.
This formulation conveniently points to the near vacuity of the
principle as long as we do not explain how we define or would exempt
injury.

Another, still more severe conception:

... every act of injury to a living creature and endorsement of such
an act by refraining from non-violent effort, whenever possible, to
prevent it, is a breach of *ahimsa*.

This declaration widens the concept so as to make it an act of violence
to *ahimsa* from efforts to prevent injurious acts, for instance
suppression, manipulation, exploitation. Unjust societies are violent in
this sense. Retreat to the dead regions of the Himalayas or Antarctics does
not avail; sitting there you are violent if some preventable violence of
the active or passive kind is going on somewhere else. The width of
the above conception depends upon how widely we conceive the 'pos-
sible': you are violent if you do not prevent violence which it is pos-
sible for you to prevent. Taking 'possible' in a wide sense we get an-
other zero-degree of *ahimsa* and a maximum of *ahimsa* useful as an
indication of an ideal limit, but otherwise inapplicable.

When Gandhi in his life as politician declared that this or that was
violence, he mostly had such narrower concepts of violence in mind.
They must be placed somewhere between 'crude malevolent physical
violence' and 'physical or mental injury, temporary or permanent.'
What he had in mind in each instance cannot be found by looking
at any definition, or general accounts of his views.

The study of the etymology and various usages of *ahimsa*, and the
study of various concepts of *ahimsa* which Gandhi may have had in
mind, is of limited usefulness. It should not be neglected, but neither
should it be taken to offer any key to the understanding of the im-
mensely complex of Gandhi's thought and action.

One may justifiably talk about the political ethics of non-violence
(as conceived by Gandhi). But since Gandhi never attempted any
systematization, his ethics can only be explicated in the form of
hypothetical reconstruction. Considering the vast area of activity in
which Gandhi applied ethical valuations, it is not surprising that his
ethics, if at all systematizable, must be immensely complex. There are
no easy ways of deriving fairly concrete policies of action from the
general and abstract, and often non-cognitively expressed, basic rules
or maxims of 'non-violence' as applied to political life. This was clearly
realized by Gandhi himself:

There are problems of Truth, but it is not very hard to understand
what Truth is. In understanding *Ahimsa* we every now and
then find ourselves out of our depth. *Ahimsa* was discussed in the
Ashram at greater length than any other subject. Even now the
question often arises whether a particular act is violent or non-
violent.

Some admirers of Gandhi insist that he should not be systematized be-
cause no living ethics can be, and because such a thing is foreign to
his spirit. But the intense and protracted discussion, favoured by Gandhi
himself, as to whether this or that act is consistent with *ahimsa* for-
ishes a convincing refutation of the 'irrationalists'. The only im-
portant thing is to keep the pretenions of any rational reconstruction
realistic, that is, at a rather modest level.

2. Gandhi on non-violence

After so much conceptual gymnastics, the reader ought to be rewarded
by enlightening quotations from the Mahatma himself. They show
the intended universal applicability, active character, and multifarious
forms of non-violence:

*Ahimsa* is not the crude thing it has been made to appear. Not to
hurt any living thing is no doubt part of *Ahimsa*, but it is its least
expression. The principle of *Ahimsa* is hurt by every evil thought,
by undue haste, by lying, by hatred, by wishing ill to anybody...

In its negative form, it means not injuring any living being whether
by body or mind. I may not, therefore, hurt the person of any
wrong-doer or bear any ill-will to him and so cause him mental suf-
fering. This statement does not cover suffering caused to the wrong-
doer by natural acts of mine which do not proceed from ill-will. It
therefore, does not prevent me from withdrawing from his presence
a child whom he, we shall imagine, it about to strike. Indeed, the
proper practice of *Ahimsa* requires me to withdraw the intended
victim from the wrong-doer, if I am in any way whatsoever the
guardian of such a child...

*Ahimsa* really means that you may not offend anybody, you may
not harbour an unchastised thought even in connection with one
who may consider himself to be your enemy...

If we resent a friend's action or the so-called enemy's action,
we still fall short of this doctrine... If we harbour even this
thought, we depart from this doctrine of *ahimsa*. Those who join the
ashram have in literally accept that meaning. That does not mean
that we practice that doctrine in its entirety. Far from it. It is an ideal which we have to reach, and it is an ideal to be reached even at this very moment, if we are capable of doing so.

In its positive form, Ahimsa means the greatest love, the greatest charity. If I am a follower of Ahimsa I must love my enemy. I must apply the same rules to the wrong-doer who is my enemy or a stranger to me as I would to my wrong-doing father or son. This active Ahimsa necessarily includes truth and fearlessness. As man cannot deceive the loved one, he does not fear or frighten him or her. Gift of life is the greatest of all gifts; a man who gives it in reality, disarms all hostility. He has paved the way for an honourable understanding. And none who is himself subject to fear can bestow that gift. He must therefore be himself fearless. A man cannot then practice Ahimsa and be a coward at the same time. The practice of Ahimsa calls forth the greatest courage.

My reverent study of the scriptures of the world has led me to the belief that all register emphatic and unequivocal testimony in favour of non-violence being practised by all, not merely singly but collectively as well. In all humility I have often felt that having no access to grind and having by nature a detached mind, I give a truer interpretation of the Hindu, Islamic or other scriptures. For this humble claim I anticipate the forgiveness of Sanatanaists, Christians and Mussalmans.

3. Gandhi on truth

Even at the cost of some repetition we shall stress the relation between non-violent ethics of struggles and persistent disagreements in spite of an honest unremitting search for Truth.

The most famous dialogue of the relation between Truth and non-violence is that between the Hunter Committee’s council and Gandhi in 1919. Since the details of the dialogue, however well known, have not sufficiently impressed all students of Gandhi, we find it justifiable to quote from it:

Council: However honestly a man may strive in his search for truth, his notions of truth may be different from the notions of others. Who then is to determine the truth?
Accused: The individual himself would determine that.
Council: Different individuals would have different views as to truth. Would that not lead to confusion?
Accused: I do not think so.
Council: Honest striving after truth differs in every case.

Accused: That is why the non-violence part was a necessary corollary. Without that there would be confusion and worse.

The most crucial point is perhaps Gandhi’s admission that ‘honestly striving after truth differs in every case’. Such an admission makes it altogether natural to look at violent opponents, even terrorists, without moral indignation, in so far as they are honest strivers after truth. And who is able to judge the degree of honesty of others? Gandhi’s line of information and persuasion is firmly based on the admission of honestly held opposite views, and of his high degree of ignorance concerning the efforts made by different people to arrive at facts or plausible hypotheses.

Highly significant are the following three central passages concerning the relation of ahimsa to truth:

The more I search after Truth the more I feel it is all-inclusive. Truth is not covered by non-violence. But I often experience that non-violence is included in truth. What a pure heart feels at a particular time is Truth; by remaining firm on that, undiluted Truth can be attained. This does not involve any conflict of duty or conscience either. But difficulties often arise in determining what non-violence is. The use of bacteria-destroying liquid is also violence. It is only by firm adherence to truth that one can live non-violently in a world which is full of violence. I can, therefore, derive non-violence out of truth.

In this quotation, the personal and pragmatic component of Gandhi’s use of the term ‘truth’ has gained the upper hand. The epistemological component has been submerged and it is only this that makes it not too unlikely that non-violence can be derived from truth. Mostly, Gandhi – as shown above – stresses the difficulty of finding truth, and the inevitability of conflicting views. If there are opposite views about what is happening in a conflict, one may unintentionally injure one or both sides. A pure heart is not enough, as Gandhi often shows; one must try to reach a true opinion about what is going on.

It is perhaps clear from the foregoing, that without Ahimsa it is not possible to seek and find Truth. Ahimsa and Truth are so intertwined that it is practically impossible to disentangle and separate them. They are like the two sides of a coin, or rather of a smooth un stamped metal disc. Who can say, which is the obverse, and which is the reverse? Nevertheless Ahimsa is the means; Truth is
the end. Means to be means must always be within our reach, and so Ahimsa is our supreme duty. 69

Most of the components of the Truth concept are manifest in the following elucidation of the relation of Truth to non-violence:

But it is impossible for us to realize perfect Truth so long as we are imprisoned in this mortal frame. We can only visualize it in our imagination. We cannot, through the instrumentality of this ephemeral body, see face to face Truth which is eternal. That is why in the last resort one must depend on faith.

It appears that the impossibility of full realization of Truth in the mortal body led some ancient seeker after Truth to the appreciation of Ahimsa. The question which confronted him was: Shall I bear with those who create difficulties for me, or shall I destroy them? The seeker realized that he who went on destroying others did not make headway but simply stayed where he was, while the man who suffered those who created difficulties marched ahead, and at times even took others with him. 69

In short: the seeker after Truth understands that it never will be within reach, that he always will be more or less in untruth and error. This makes him non-violent.

In our attempt to condense and systematize Gandhi's teaching on group conflicts it has been necessary to cut out some of these themes relating to Truth and non-violence. We have adopted the subordination of non-violence to Truth—the latter notion split into two, that of truth with a small t and self-realization.

E. A conceptual reconstruction

Gandhi often speaks about realizing Truth and realizing God, 70 somewhat more rarely of realizing self. 70 He nevertheless maintains that 'self-realization is the subject of the Gita as it is of all scriptures'. 70 In order to condense the teaching and make it more universally understandable, the aspects of realization may be reduced to two: the search for self-realization or God or Truth with a capital T, and the search for truth (with a small t).

From truth with a small t, or from the ontological or epistemological concept of truth, no ahimsa principle can be derived. But one may construct a derivation by taking 'search for God or Truth' to be, in the main, other names for the more understandable self-realization, and add a metaphysical postulate announcing the essential or ultimate

existence of all living beings. From the premises that one should realize one's self and that all (living) selves are ultimately one, the necessity of both truth-seeking and ahimsa may be derived.

We now introduce a concept of an individual P's self-realization as realization of P's potentialities of complete expression. The actual, realized level of self-realization may show variation and can never reach the theoretical maximum. There are different kinds of measures of level of self-realization. Therefore when applied in the following, Gandhi's criteria are presupposed. According to Gandhi, the path towards an individual's maximum self-realization does not necessarily obstruct the paths of others; on the contrary, mutual aid is possible and desirable.

For the sake of our condensed conceptual reconstruction we shall now introduce a general concept of non-violence:

Himsa (violence) is avoidable direct influence in the direction of a decrease of level of actual self-realization. Ahimsa (non-violence) is direct influence in the direction of an increase of level of actual self-realization.

According to Gandhi, a decrease or increase of self-realization in one individual involves a decrease or increase (not necessarily of the equal magnitude) of the self-realization of others. 70 Thus himsa by anyone against anyone is himsa also against me.

The main motive for introducing this broad concept of violence, and the corresponding narrow concept of non-violence, is to make it possible to subsume all those phenomena under it which Gandhi actually does subsume. To put it more directly, we wish to subsume exploitation, suppression, and other phenomena which are best defined without reference to any person's acting with manifest physical violence against another. Impersonal, structural, sociological phenomena which in an avoidable way decrease or obstruct the increase of self-realization will be subsumable.

How Gandhi himself made such subsumptions will be clear later. Here we shall only recall his dictum that the essence of violence is exploitation, and that an unjust law is itself a species of violence. 70

Graphical presentation

In what follows these principles and norms from which the norms and hypotheses of Gandhi's teaching on group struggle are explicitly derived are, first of all, made explicit and then fitted into a graphical presentation. There is of course more than one way in which such a derivation can be effected. That given here is called 'Systematization of 4' for easy reference.
ience' and it connects with the metaphysics of satyagraha. One weakness of the definition consists in the tacitness of the assumption that the barriers are 'objectively unnecessary', that is, that economic and other conditions are such in the society in which P and Q exist, that one could afford Q the higher degree of self-expression made possible by lifting the barriers. In order to clarify this assumption we would have to introduce a large portion of contemporary (highly controversial) sociological and economic conceptual framework.

Absence of manifest physical person-to-person violence is not enough to characterize a relation as non-violent, according to theorists of the New Violence. Barriers to complete self-realization or, more precisely, to a degree of self-realization deemed practically realizable given certain existing economic and technical resources, are taken to indicate conditions of violence. The economic underdog–topdog relation is taken equally seriously by Gandhi and the new leaders of violence as a kind of violence (himsa). Gandhi once even called exploitation 'the essence of violence'. But there are also other similarities.

The criticism of past non-violent campaigns concerning race relations has centered around the slowness of the machinery, and the timidity and modesty of their claims. Non-violent movements in the USA have not until recently asked for justice now.

Gandhi at least sometimes asked for immediate basic changes. In 1942 he started the 'Quit-India' campaign – one of his least successful, perhaps – but not untypical of his impatience, his 'immodesty', of his belief in the practical possibility of, as well as the immediate need for, a rapid radical change, that is, a non-violent revolution. Appeals to students to leave the colleges and fight for freedom are examples of actions based on a requirement of rapid change. What made Gandhi sometimes choose rather modest targets was the (very realistic) suspicion that the Indian populace was far from ripe for taking over the institutions led by the British. And what made him sometimes cancel campaigns was the (also realistic) suspicion that the population was not yet sufficiently non-violent, which means that they would not be able to achieve what Gandhi saw as the goal: a non-violent society.

But on the whole, revolutionary impatience is something the new leaders of violence have in common with Gandhi. It is also a point in which he differs from Martin Luther King and some of the other great-civil rights personalities. Gandhi had a toughness and disregard of bloody confrontations which many Christian pacifists found bordering on savagery.

There is still another similarity: the brutal Gandhian norm 'seek

the centre of the conflict', or more generally, the stress on activist confrontations with the system, and strong resentment of passivity or mere verbal support of the fighters. And, of course, the insight of how participation in direct action radicalizes.

The new tendency is to proclaim that things cannot continue as they are, radical change must come immediately, nobody can be allowed to remain passive. Polarization of opinion, however painful, is necessary. And with the present productive capacity and manpower a just and non-violent society can be realized.

Some of these points reveal the stress on antagonisms, on structures rather than antagonists. This stress is a main feature of Marxist thinking. Certain antagonisms must immediately be eliminated — but without necessarily eliminating any of the antagonists.

As a consequence of proclaiming it a duty to act vigorously and immediately, the new leaders, just as Gandhi, engage in lively direct agitation and preaching at the grass-roots, refusing to be hampered by 'democratic' machinery. If the machinery is ill-equipped to cope with large-scale injustice, direct action must be resorted to. Gandhi did not try to quell communal riots through laws and parliamentary action.

Indian nationalist politicians of the Congress Party accepted Gandhi as a leader because of his unrivalled influence among the masses, 'at the grass-roots', but there was always uneasiness about his relation to the party-system and later to the whole parliamentary set-up. It suited neither his temperament nor his philosophy.

There is, in Gandhi's view, nothing sacred about the electoral or legal system. Yet there is, of course, a grave responsibility in suspending or violating the system. Every plan to break a law must be thoroughly discussed and illuminated before its implementation.

4. The basic requirement of self-respect: fearlessness

When Gandhi left South Africa and started work in India, he realized that the masses in India could not immediately be mobilized to political action for independence, for swaraj.

From prolonged hunger or undernourishment apathy follows. Gandhi sometimes complained that the most frustrating thing of all was the unwillingness of the hungry to do anything to change their own personal lot. He found that the basic obstacle, when trying to mobilize the masses, was their feeling of powerlessness, uselessness, and insignificance. From this attitude there follows a lack of personal identity and personal norms, and, of course, lack of initiative to find ways of producing more and better food.

Gandhi was unable to effect any radical change in the food situat-
tion, he could not radically eliminate undernourishment and unemployment. But in spite of this he managed to awaken the masses and to mobilize them. How? One of his greatest inventions was the Khadi.

The Khadi movement and certain similar undertakings had a variety of aims. But one basic aim was precisely to get the poor, unemployed, suppressed and passive to realize that they were persons with an identity, a dignity, that they were worth something, and not completely helpless.

At this point it might be inserted that political opponents of Gandhi described the Khadi movement as if it were Gandhi’s complete answer to India’s economic crisis. This way of misconceiving the movement was reported in a well-known article by the author Arthur Koestler in The Sunday Times, October 5, 1969. But Gandhi did not nurture the fantastic hope of solving India’s economic problems by bringing back the handloom and the spinning wheel. He had great confidence in intensive agriculture, including irrigation, using refined machinery. He had less confidence in industrialization as a means of overcoming poverty and lack of work in the villages. The increasing flow of the unemployed towards great cities created terrible problems. The ugly riots were all starting in the big slums. Gandhi saw the necessity of creating conditions such that people could on the whole remain in their villages except for the few that big industry would need. Indian Marxists were squarely against his economic views, being convinced that the proper course of India was the one followed in Soviet Russia in the years after the revolution, that is, giving first priority immediately to heavy industry. The correctness of this policy is now much disputed, but its advocates in the 1920s and 30s of course found Gandhi’s stress on agriculture insufferably reactionary.

Gandhi’s propaganda for the spinning wheel was first of all a successful campaign against the vices of passivity and resulting lack of self-respect of the very poor. Making their cloth meant for thousands of jobless wretches the start of a new kind of life, and participation in a national struggle for liberation. Marxists at that time were very much against the religious aura surrounding the spinning wheel, and the poet Tagore detested the frenzy of the campaigns.

If a hundred or two hundred million underfed and more or less jobless villagers in India were to try to get industrial work in the cities, what would happen? ‘Heavy industries will need to be centralized and nationalized. But they will occupy the least part of the vast national activity which will mainly be in the villages.’ (See, for instance, Gandhi’s Towards Non-violent Socialism). He had ‘no partiality for return to primitive methods’, but village industry was the only ‘way of giving employment to the millions who are living in idleness’. Gandhi went perhaps too far in his fight for decentralization and against the creation of big proletarians, but recent developments in the West have made Gandhian value priorities worth serious study.

The participation of the poor and underprivileged in the Khadi movement and vigorous campaigns such as the salt-search with obvious, particularly direct relevance for their economic well-being, fostered the minimum of self-respect which was indispensable for meaningful participation in non-violent campaigns. One may say that Gandhi’s strategy included as a preliminary step the lifting up of people from the status of nonentities to a level where self-realization was conceivable as an aim. Only on that level could self-discipline, born of self-respect and dignity, be reckoned upon under harsh provocations and frustrations. Self-respect, in short, is a prerequisite for non-violent mass campaigns.

Martin Luther King was completely clear about the basic function of self-respect in struggles for liberation:

With a spirit straining toward true self-esteem, the Negro must boldly throw off the chains of self-abnegation and say to himself and the world: ‘I am somebody. I am a person. I am a man with dignity and honor.’

But to tell a Negro of the ghettos who does not feel he is somebody to tell boldly to the world ‘I am somebody’ is not a meaningful strategy. The strategy had to be one of leading black people from ‘nothing and nowhere’ towards a point where they could honestly say ‘I am somebody’. Only then may the process start of boldly throwing off all the signs of slavery. ‘Psychological freedom, a firm sense of self-esteem, is the most powerful weapon against the long night of physical slavery’, says Martin Luther King. Yes, but that weapon must be forged, and those who do not have that firm sense of self-esteem are precisely those who cannot do the forging by themselves.

Gandhi and Martin Luther King both faced the question of creating self-respect, but it seems that Gandhi was more inventive in his choice of methods, or that the social and cultural condition of the Indian peasants was in certain senses better than that of the Northern blacks in their ghettos.

5. Violence preferable to cowardice

Fearlessness is indispensable for the growth of the other noble qualities. How can one seek Truth, or cherish Love, without fearlessness?
Gandhi held fearlessness to be a necessary condition of all other high
qualities. It has a position in his 'system' that can only be justified by
linking it closely to necessary conditions of self-realization, and there-
fore of active search for truth.

To run away from danger, instead of facing it, is to deny one's
faith in man and God, even one's own self. 

If a person is not willing to take risks, he will not follow any insight
or any personal conviction, if it seems 'dangerous' to do so. Lack of
fearlessness Gandhi likens to call cowardice, even if this lack is rather
modest and quite common.

The long road towards non-violence cannot be followed, according
to Gandhi, if one does not fight cowardice — even when it entails
acting with violence. Some quotations are needed in order to follow
his somewhat complicated thinking on this point.

I found, throughout my wanderings in India, that India, educated
India, is seized with a paralyzing fear. We may not open our lips
in public; we may not declare our confirmed opinions in public... if
you want to follow the path of Truth in any shape or form, fearless-
lessness is the necessary consequence. ... We fear consequences
and therefore we are afraid to tell the truth.

I believe that, whereas there is only a choice between cowardice and
violence, I would advise violence. 

Critics of Martin Luther King stress that a man who lacks self-
respect and self-identity cannot — or at least cannot be supposed to
— refrain from violence when met with violence — except from
cowardice. His 'reflexes' answer violence with violence, the question
is only 'Do I dare?'

Martin Luther King and pacifists in general have tended to reject countriversalization at the same time as they have deployed cowardice.

It is the choice between violence and cowardice in such cases that
the Black Power critics (in the wide sense of the term 'Black Power')
tell us essentially characterizes the situation for the majority of black
citizens in the United States. They daily meet structural discrimina-
ction, structural violence.

If the choice between violence and cowardice is constantly repeated,
and the victim of violence's answer every time to 'Dare 177 is to turn
away — avoiding the conflict or merely turning the other cheek —
cowardly attitude is reinforced. The chance of standing up next time
and of hitting back, decreases. In the long run the chances of standing
up in any way whatsoever decrease.

This kind of description by the Black Power leaders not only re-
sounds us of similar descriptions by Gandhi, it follows Gandhi's utter-
ances word by word.

The new leaders exhort their poor followers to hit back if insulted.
Compare this with Gandhi:

If you feel humiliated, you will be justified in slapping the bully in
the face or taking whatever action you might deem necessary to
ventilate your self-respect. The use of force, in the circumstances,
would be the natural consequence if you are not a coward. But if
you have assimilated the non-violent spirit, there is no feeling
of humiliation in you.

One might add: the person with non-violent spirit does not feel
humiliated by insulting behaviour on the part of others, because his
self-respect nullifies the effect of the insult. The insulting words or
deed simply do not impress him, and he naturally does not feel any
smaller. There is no feeling of shame, or reduction in status, of loss of
dignity. It is the aggressor that loses in dignity, not the so-called victim.
The quotation makes a priority clear: of the two goals 'stop con-
trolling yourself as humiliated' and 'stop answering violence with vio-

ence' the first is prior. Only when the first goal has already been
reached can the second be accepted unconditionally.

The quotation is not only significant as one among dozens of clear
statements assessing the negative value of cowardice as greater than
the negative value of violence, it is also one of the few but clear indica-
tions of the immense importance Gandhi attached to self-respect.
Fixed with a potential loss of self-respect, it is the prime concern of
the individual to avoid the loss. Loss of self-respect must be avoided
even if the only way to do it, as perceived by the individual, is to be
violent, to be criminal, to murder. This seems to be the conse-
cquence of Gandhi's remark on humiliation and violence.

How can Gandhi justify going to such extremes? Because without a
minimum of self-respect, of inner security, one cannot even reach the
road leading towards self-realization, and this again means that one
cannot start on the road towards non-violence. That road takes off
from the road towards self-realization, not vice versa. The man feeling
he is 'moody', a 'no-person', may help himself to be somebody by
acts which cannot be tolerated by mature persons.

An important lesson expressed by the quotation can be summed up
as follows: Participants in a conflict perceive the situation differently
according to their level of self-respect. At a very low level, the be-
haviour of the opponent is likely to be experienced as humiliating and provocative. To let oneself be provoked indicates loss of self-respect and admission of powerlessness. At a higher level, with higher degrees of self-security, no violent behaviour of the opponent is experienced as humiliating, and none as provocative. Then one's own violence may be experienced as humiliating, not that of the opponent. A concentration camp guard tends to believe that when a convict is forced to creep through mud in front of hundreds of his fellow-inmates, the victim loses dignity and self-respect, whereas the witnesses only see the less of these qualities in the guard.

In India Gandhi succeeded to an unprecedented degree in raising the moral masses to a substantial level of self-respect. They were made capable of following a leader. The magic spell of Gandhi was even stronger than the imperative force of a man in uniform swinging a formidable club (lathi) and throwing people in jail. But, of course, non-violence never matured into a deep-rooted power in India. Provocations such as those experienced in the years 1946-48 proved too strong, and there was a lapse towards large-scale violence among the masses.

In the United States the urbanized blacks did not feel they had a living cultural tradition strong enough to furnish a source of self-respect and non-violent power. When Martin Luther King began his bus campaign in 1955, mobilizing 50,000 blacks, he seems to have started with masses on an even lower stage of development of self-respect and dignity then did Gandhi when in April 1919 he inaugurated his all-India satyagraha movement to secure withdrawal of the Rowlatt Bills. Black Power leaders have proved to possess a keen eye for means of raising the level of self-respect. Thus, the demand for large-scale instruction in African culture at schools and universities shows their deliberate effort to give their followers inner security. The propaganda for African hair styles, clothing and other external signs of pride in being black manifest the same tendency.

6. Violence as a means to increasing self-respect
Whatever the causes, Martin Luther King and his faithful followers did not succeed in mass-mobilization on a continental or subcontinental scale. Wonderful feats of non-violence under brutal attacks, and supreme personal achievement in civil rights cases could not make up for the lack of mass support. Impatience grew by leaps and bounds, and the cry for immediate, radical change was heard more and more often. It issued from people who knew the potentialities of non-violence: '...you know history has been triggered by trivial-seeming incidents. Once a little nobody Indian lawyer was put off a train, and fed up with injustice, he twisted a knot in the British Lion's tail. His name was Mahatma Gandhi' (Malcolm X). But they did not believe in the prospect of consistent non-violence in the crisis of race relations.

Now, what the Black Power leaders have done is essentially to tolerate and to some extent encourage counter-violence, to hit back when hit, and it is my hypothesis that the subtle, not always conscious, but strong motive has been that of building up self-respect, a sense of dignity and of inner security.

There have, of course, been mixed motives and the expressed aims testify to this. But there is enough evidence and material, verbal and non-verbal, to maintain the self-respect theory of Black Power violence. Incidentally, J.-P. Sartre seems (in his introduction to Fanon's book) to agree with them as to the function of counter-violence:

The native cures himself of colonial neurosis by thrusting out the settler through force of arms. When his rage boils over, he rediscovers his lost innocence and he knows himself in that he himself creates his self. Far removed from his war, we consider it as a triumph of barbarism; but of its own volition it achieves, slowly but surely, the emancipation of the rebel, for bit by bit it destroys in him and around him the colonial gloom. To shoot down a European is to kill two birds with one stone: to destroy an oppressor and the man he oppresses at the same time; there remains a dead man, and a free man...

Fanon puts it in this way:

At the level of individuals, violence is a cleansing force. It frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect.

At a deeper psychoanalytic level Erik H. Erikson traces the connection between Fanon's killing and the basic Gandhian hypothesis that violence against the other is violence against oneself (cf. *H4, p. 54*):

That killing, in fact, may be a necessary self-cure for colonized people was Dr. Franz Fanon's conviction and message... An implicit therapeutic intent, then, seems to be a common denominator in theories and ideologies of action which, on the level of deeds, seem to exclude each other totally. What they nevertheless have in common is the intuition that violence against the adversary and violence against the self are inseparable; what divides them is the programme of dealing with either.
Martin Luther King puts it in a slightly different way:

With a spirit strained toward true self-esteem, the Negro must boldly throw off the manacles of self-abnegation and say to himself and the world: 'I am somebody. I am a person. I am a man with dignity and honor.'

Showing his understanding of the basic function of self-respect in the struggle for liberation, King continues:

Psychological freedom, a firm sense of self-esteem, is the most powerful weapon against the long night of physical slavery. Our contention is that a minimum of self-esteem is a necessary condition of non-violent (as well as violent) struggle, and that no exhortations but only action can help to create this minimum, if absent. But the question is: must the action be violent? Gandhi's answer is 'no,' that of Sartre and De Mon 'yes'.

The conclusion is justified that none of the 'tough' black power leaders take physical violence to be more than a preliminary to more constructive efforts. The mental violence — abuse, vilification, distortion in words — will perhaps remain popular as an outlet, but sooner or later constructive efforts will be seen to suffer disproportionately from the hot flow of verbal provocation. There will probably be a tendency towards non-violent non-cooperation and the building of parallel institutions, at least in the economic sector. The war of words and small-scale, agoraphobic, personal aggressiveness will be found to be economically, too costly, if not degrading and undignified for conscientious blacks who clearly see that such tough behaviour is characteristic of the whites they despise.

Our aim has been to describe and compare points of view, not to offer any criticism. This may perhaps make it not entirely out of the way to make a small personal comment: we agree that non-provoked, spontaneous, violence is sometimes a cleansing force. But the cleansing force is dependent upon spontaneity. Premeditated violence instigated by gang leaders and supported by articulated group norms is scarcely a cleansing force. Therefore the policy of violence, deliberative plans to use violence as a means in certain group conflict, cannot be vindicated as a means of creating self-respect. Nor does the policy seem able to solve the long-range problems Martin Luther King had in mind. Furthermore, Black Power leaders tend to defend violence mainly as a desperate means to protect themselves individually against murderous police forces. We thus come basically back to the non-violent approach, but with a better appreciation of the indispensability of constructive programmes, and otherwise of attempts to increase self-respect within the weakest groups.

7. Satyagraha is not a set of techniques

In a description of Gandhi's satyagraha one error has perhaps been more damaging for adequate understanding than all the others put together: the description of satyagraha as a mere bundle of techniques. A central characteristic of a technique is its pure instrumentality, its character of being a mere means to an end.

Consider the technique of shooting: a gun may be used by anybody with sufficient know-how. Its use may be quite independent of the thoughts and motivation of the person using it. But this is emphatically not the case with non-violence. For an action to be part of a non-violent campaign it must conform, at least roughly, to the norms and hypotheses characteristic of non-violence, those being the conscious expressions of non-violent behaviour, attitudes, institutions. The normative system implied may, of course, be conceived in somewhat different ways and one may have different degrees of approximation to an ideal campaign. But the techniques, described in terms of overt behaviour, cannot be detached from the characteristic norms and hypotheses. A strike, a stay-at-home, or a fast, described in terms of behaviour, are not yet instances of satyagraha. They must conform with norms and hypotheses of satyagraha, and they are therefore unsuccessful if the opponent or the general public perceives only the behaviour, not its symbolic aspect.

Joan Bondurant and others have tried to compare levels of purity of non-violence in different campaigns. One must, of course, allow for practical errors of judgment and some transgression of norms, but there is less room for variation in intention. If there is no serious resolve to act non-violently, following most of the norms, this has immediate consequences for how one appears to and is interpreted by the opponent. It is in most cases easy to detect superficiality. One of the most common attitudes is that of trying out non-violence, and, if that does not lead to success, intending to use violence. This strategy leads to a head-on collision with the norms and hypotheses of non-violence. The thought 'I shall first be non-violent, and if it does not succeed I am justified in using violence' is contradictory. There can be no such first-rank non-violence.

The (implicit, rarely explicit) rejection of satyagraha by the leaders of the New Violence is based in part on this misleading picture of satyagraha: they describe black people participating in a march or other
action as if the external behaviour was identical with the action of satyagraha. The picture lacks a description of a positive content of the action itself, its goal-revealing aspect. And the attitude of the blacks is described in terms of humiliation and passivity: their being abused, hit in the face without their ‘doing anything’. They have also been described as obsessed by fear and hatred all along. Their church is burned, what shall they do? Nothing, according to certain Black Leader descriptions of the non-violence of Martin Luther King.

From the preliminary definition of a satyagraha campaign as a campaign consistent with, and expressive of, a non-violent system of norms and hypotheses, it immediately follows that satyagraha is not a technique. The inclusion of hypotheses is essential: One cannot be asked to believe in certain hypotheses, as part of a technique. The technique of fixing a gun is independent of any beliefs concerning the meaning and consequences of the behaviour involved in using it.

One is not master of one’s beliefs, one cannot normally adopt and reject them according to the needs of the moment. In so far as one is able to do this, one violates the requirements of truthfulness. Nor can one believe in a norm, or respect it, as part of a technique. But one can believe in norms and hypotheses as part of a total creed, and develop techniques of action that are consistent with, and expressive of, this creed. Thus, one may be asked to break a law, to distribute food, to carry a banner, etc. as part of a campaign expressive of a creed. If the creed is absent, one cannot do what was asked.

To call satyagraha a method rather than a technique is less misleading, because the etymological meaning involves that of a way of acting or living. But if a non-violent campaign is said to be a way of planning and carrying out a campaign, it is only a way that can be adopted by persons who share certain beliefs and attitudes. The confusing point about this terminology is that some of these beliefs and attitudes are part of ‘the way’. Thus, in discussions where theoretical clarity is a issue, satyagraha should not be classified (only) as a method or way of struggle or conflict solution.

How much is required of shared beliefs depends upon one’s role in the campaign. Gandhi expected much more of a leader and strategist than of a follower.

Confronted with the hypotheses characteristic of belief in satyagraha, many people, including military leaders, will instinctively reject or accept them as true, or as convincing or highly probable. Uncertainty prevails as to their relative validity or invalidity. It therefore makes sense when military leaders or others who traditionally support institutions of violence, favour experiments in satyagraha. They favour its tentative use in various kinds of situations. It makes sense in so far as it is a reasonable way of testing the hypotheses which the satyagrahi assert with some dogmatism. But those engaged in more testing are not yet satyagrahi. Satyagraha cannot properly be used, because it is not a technique, but an instrument.

The point is of importance because the opponent cannot be expected to be impressed by an appeal to the brain and the heart, when the appeal is an experimental appeal, a test of power. The difference from a genuine appeal is all too clear in face-to-face confrontations. An appeal to the heart is expected to come from the heart, not from the brain of the experimenter.

The mistake of taking satyagraha to be a technique is, of course, not as widespread as the tendency to use the word ‘technique’ for it. Some of the theoreticians (Bourdieu and others) who use the word make it clear that it is not a technique in the sense of a mere instrumentality, independent of the convictions and attitudes of the user. The various activities involved in satyagraha may contain the use of techniques, for instance, making salt, spinning, preparing meals, beating drums, singing songs, building houses, opening banks. But these are not characteristic of the satyagraha as a whole.

The light-hearted use of the term ‘technique’ and the neglect of systematic study of the roots of non-violence in ethics and metaphysics has facilitated the wrong classification of some political, racial, and student campaigns as non-violent. Demonstrations, strikes, and fasts have been classified as Gandhian and conceived as non-violent when it is only the case that they have avoided manifest physical violence. But their lack of success seems often to be due precisely to the neglect of the basic norms of Gandhian struggle.

Isolated traits of Gandhian conflict behaviour have been studied from the point of view of game theory. Thus, R. H. Kitagard uses ‘two-party conflict models’ to study satyagraha ‘as a tactic’. He does not deny that it is sometimes a successful tactic, but finds that it contains ‘many contradictions and inconsistent strategic implications’.22 This is hardly surprising. What is lamentable is the more or less implicit assumption that one either has to treat Gandhi in a snoot and refrain from analysis or also think of him as a tactician. Gandhian conflict behaviour must be studied in relation to a norm-system. Any analysis solely in terms of tactic, technique, or method must lead nowhere.

5. The use of violence as a sign of impurity

As systematized by our set of norms and hypotheses, any kind of violence in any kind of conflict situation violates at least one norm. Violence is never right.